



G20 Summit
Toronto, Ontario
June 2010

Toronto Police Service After-Action Review
June 2011

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Message from Chief William Blair

On June 29, 2010, I announced that a report would be prepared on the actions of the Toronto Police Service during the G20 Summit, focusing on what we did and how we did it. I felt it was essential we take a comprehensive look at what went well and what did not.

We are fully accountable to the people of Toronto. Whatever other reviews are underway, and we are cooperating fully with all of them, we owe it to the people we are sworn to serve and protect to take a hard look at ourselves. There are many questions about Summit events in Toronto last June. The people of this city are entitled to ask tough questions, and they have. We must do our best to answer those questions.

We must always strive to learn. We must look to the future, to large public-order events in Toronto, to see how we can respond to constantly evolving challenges. I have no doubt this report will also benefit law-enforcement agencies elsewhere in Canada and abroad.

I must take this opportunity to commend the men and women who came together, from 26 police agencies, with a fraction of the normal planning time, to face challenges unprecedented in Toronto's history. The overwhelming majority of them responded magnificently, very often facing danger and extreme provocation. I am proud of them.

I also want to recognize TPS members who were responsible for planning such a massive operation. They were faced with huge logistical challenges. They had much less time to prepare than policing colleagues elsewhere in the world, yet they did a superb job, ensuring structures and supplies were in place. Their contribution was enormous.

Last June, we saw levels of violence we had never seen before in Toronto. People came to the G20 Summit, not to engage in debate or discussion or demonstrations, but to infiltrate lawful, peaceful protests, and use them as cover to commit vandalism and violence.

The policing challenges of facilitating those very large, lawful, peaceful protests while, at the same time, arresting those who chose violence and destruction, were immense.

This report takes a hard look at what happened. Many things we did very well. Some things we did not. I am confident that we can work very effectively with those members of our communities who are committed to an evidence-based examination of the Summit events of last June.



William Blair, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Foreword

In June of 2008, Prime Minister Harper announced that Canada would host the 2010 G8 Summit in Huntsville, Ontario, on June 25 and June 26, allowing policing authorities in that region two years to plan the event. In December 2009, the Prime Minister announced that Toronto would host the 2010 G20 Summit on June 26 and June 27. This gave the Toronto Police Service (TPS) six months to plan for the largest security event in Canadian history. The Metro Toronto Convention Centre (MTCC) was identified as the location for the G20 Summit in February 2010, which added significant logistical and security considerations.

The Summit Management Office (SMO), part of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, was responsible for the logistical arrangements of the G8/G20 Summits.

As the annual G20 Summits are very high profile gatherings of international leaders, they are subject both to extensive lobbying by advocacy groups and to public demonstrations. Given this history, it was anticipated that similar challenges would present themselves to the organizers of the G20 Summit in Toronto.

The central coordinating body for the G8/G20 Summits security planning, operations and demobilization activities was the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)-led Integrated Security Unit (ISU). Key partners within the ISU included TPS, Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Peel Regional Police (PRP), and the Canadian Forces (CF).

Operating under the ISU was a Steering Committee, the Unified Command Centre (UCC), the GTA Area Command Centre (ACC), and the Major Incident Command Centre (MICC). Command and control was delivered through these interconnected centers at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

The TPS was responsible for the safety and security of the public in all areas of Toronto outside of the RCMP-protected zones, as well as for supporting the RCMP in protecting Internationally Protected Persons (IPPs).

The TPS MICC was responsible for managing all TPS specific G8/G20 Summits responsibilities. The MICC was primarily focused on G20 Summit security responsibilities in Toronto but also provided secondary and indirect security support to the G8 Summit in Huntsville.

The TPS' mission for the 2010 G8/G20 Summits (Toronto events) was to develop, deliver, and implement integrated security plans which:

- Support the RCMP and their mandate ensuring the safety and security of the G8/G20 Summits delegations
- Provide security commensurate to the threat level and the public nature of events involved with this visit
- Ensure the safety and security of the public and law enforcement personnel
- Respect the democratic right of individuals to demonstrate and create the right conditions for peaceful protest; and freedoms of thought, belief, opinion, expression and peaceful assembly, and
- Minimize disruption and inconvenience for Toronto residents and businesses

While host cities of previous G20 summits had two years to prepare, the TPS met the security demands required to facilitate this global economic summit in just six months. The TPS was successful in fulfilling its mission to support the RCMP and their mandate of ensuring the safety and security of G20 Summit delegations. At no time was security breached at the G20 Summit sites nor was the safety of IPPs ever compromised.

Securing the MTCC and surrounding G20 Summit venues required innovation and cooperation on the part of the TPS and its partner agencies. The MTCC is located in the downtown core of Toronto and is surrounded by densely packed residential and commercial buildings and major transportation infrastructure. The TPS worked closely with the RCMP, the City of Toronto, provincial and federal governments, local business owners, and residents to ensure the proper securing of the G20 Summit while respecting the rights of citizens who lived and worked in the immediate area.

Ensuring the safety and security of the public and law enforcement personnel was a high priority for the TPS in planning for the G20 Summit. As detailed in Appendix B, previous summits and similar gatherings have resulted in significant protests and extensive police action. Accordingly, the TPS developed training and operational plans to handle potentially disruptive crowds.

While it was anticipated that violent protest might occur during the G20 Summit in Toronto, it was also expected that the majority of protests would be peaceful. During the planning phase, TPS members worked with individuals and organizations to ensure they were able to exercise their democratic right to peaceful protest in a safe and effective manner. In the weeks leading up to and during the G20 Summit, the TPS facilitated many protests – the vast majority of which were uneventful.

Despite the many steps taken to minimize the occurrence of serious public disorder, violence and property damage was experienced in the downtown core during the G20 Summit. In total, 1118 people were arrested during the Summit, 39 of who reported being injured during their arrest. Ninety-seven police officers were injured in the course of carrying out their duties. No critical injuries or deaths occurred during the G20 Summit.

The violence experienced on June 26 and June 27 created unprecedented challenges for the TPS in balancing the responsibility to facilitate peaceful protest with the responsibility to prevent criminal activity and maintain public safety. Subsequent to the Summit, the TPS has diligently pursued those responsible for the worst of the violence, arresting 48 people and laying 257 *Criminal Code* charges to date. The protest activities that occurred and the valuable lessons learned therefrom are detailed in the Operational Chronology section of this report.

In addition to being responsible for the safety and security of participants at the G20 Summit, the TPS was also responsible for ensuring that regular police services continued to be delivered to the City of Toronto. On June 26 and June 27, 2010 over 4050 TPS officers were assigned to various duties relating to the G20 Summit.¹ Divisional Primary Response Unit (PRU) officers not assigned to the G20 continued with their customary duties. Shifts were increased to 12 hours to accommodate the temporary decrease in staff at the divisions. Despite the drain of resources, Divisional Unit Commanders designed continuity plans that maintained the delivery of policing services without compromising public or officer safety. Divisional PRU officers maintained an effective police presence, kept up with the demand for calls for service, and staffed other special

¹ The total uniform strength for the TPS was 5740 as of June 30, 2010.

events occurring around the city, including the Toronto Jazz Festival and local World Cup soccer celebrations.

The G20 Summit was an event unprecedented in Toronto in terms of the size and scope of its security demands and policing requirements. It was also the first time that many TPS officers had experienced widespread criminality and mass public disorder. The TPS recognizes and appreciates that as a world class city Toronto will continue to host large-scale, international events. This report focuses on key issues that arose during the planning, operational, and post-event phases of the Summit. The identified findings will enable the TPS to benefit from the experiences of the G20 Summit and provide recommendations for improved performance in future operations.

1. Geographical Areas of Responsibility

To ensure the security of the event, while minimally disrupting the movement of citizens, the area around the MTCC was divided into four areas: Controlled Access Zone (CAZ); Restricted Access Zone (RAZ); Interdiction Zones (IZ); Outer Perimeter Zone (OZ).

The RCMP, having primary jurisdiction over the security aspects of the event, was responsible for the innermost areas, the CAZ and the RAZ. This is where the majority of movement of the international delegations occurred. The TPS, as the police service of local jurisdiction, was responsible for the surrounding IZ and OZ. Being only an artificial construct for the purposes of managing the various geographic spaces, the public was able to move freely within the OZ. In the IZ, only individuals who were either pre-approved or were able to establish a legitimate need (i.e. work, place of residence), were allowed to enter. In other areas, traffic was routed along predetermined routes so as to minimally disrupt normal daily activities. Street furniture items, such as post office boxes, parking meters, small trees, newspaper boxes, and public trash cans, were removed from some areas to prevent them from being used as weapons of opportunity by protesters.

1.1 Interdiction Zone

The IZ surrounded the CAZ and RAZ with a metal chain-link security fence. The fence contained an area spanning roughly Rees Street and Windsor Street to the west, Wellington Street West to the north, Bay Street and York Street to the east, and Lakeshore Boulevard West and Bremner Boulevard to the south. The IZ fence line had several gates to allow movement in and out of the zone. (See Appendix D)

1.2 Outer Zone

The OZ was a large area outside the IZ where increased vigilance by the TPS would be necessary during the G20 Summit. This area included the immediate outer perimeter of IZ fences, consulates, Queen's Park, critical infrastructure sites, financial sites, 52 Division, TPS Headquarters, the Delta Chelsea Hotel (POU staging area), and other areas of potential concern. The OZ was divided into North and South sectors with the following defined boundaries. OZ North was bounded by Spadina Avenue to the west, Bloor Street West to the north, Jarvis Street to the east, and King Street West to the south. OZ South was bounded by Dufferin Street to the west, King Street to the north, Jarvis Street to the east, and Lake Ontario to the south.

1.3 The PATH System

The PATH System consists of 28 km of walkway and retail space. More than 50 buildings and office towers are connected through the PATH. It provides access to 20 parking garages, 5 subway stations, 2 major department stores, 6 major hotels, and a railway terminal (Union Station). It also provides links to some of Toronto's major tourist and entertainment attractions such as the Hockey Hall of Fame, Roy Thomson Hall, Air Canada Centre, Rogers Centre, and the CN Tower. Toronto City Hall and Metro Hall are also connected through the PATH.

2. Operational Chronology

2.1 Friday, June 18 to Thursday, June 24

In the week leading up to the G20 Summit weekend of June 25-27, there were many G20-related events, activities and demonstrations which took place in Toronto.

The protest events that occurred during the period of June 25-27 have garnered a great amount of attention. Viewing the incidents that led to criminality, public disorder, and property damage in isolation from the preceding full week of similar events might lead to the erroneous belief that all protest activities related to the G20 Summit were disorderly and that the policing strategy was strictly one of arrest and crowd dispersal. On the contrary, many different demonstrations took place from June 18-24 with the overwhelming majority transpiring peacefully and without notable incident. There were approximately a dozen protest events during this period, attended by thousands of individuals who were freely able to exercise their democratic right to demonstrate in a peaceful manner.

The role played by police in the events of June 18-24 was primarily to facilitate the orderly and safe movement of pedestrians in and around vehicular traffic and to undertake proportionate crowd control measures to ensure public safety. This was similar to the policing needs of the multitude of protests that have taken place in the city of Toronto in the past. Two key elements distinguished the protests and events of June 18-24 from TPS experience in previous events. The first of these was the time frame involved, in that the events were planned to, and did, occur as part of an unbroken series of activities and demonstrations stretching over ten days. Operating in tandem with the unusually long time period of the demonstrations was the considerable degree of planning and coordination linking the many disparate events together.

From June 18-20, a People's Summit comprised of civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, and interested individuals took place at Ryerson University with several associated events occurring elsewhere in the downtown core. Flowing from the People's Summit, from June 21-24, a number of demonstrations planned as part of the Themed Days of Resistance took place at various locations downtown. Focusing on the issues of migrant justice, gender justice, queer rights, disability rights, environmental and climate justice, and Indigenous sovereignty amongst others, this series of protests was positioned as the "build-up" for the Days of Action planned for June 25-27.

The above-described events, and their role as a launching pad for the more militant protests of the G20 Summit weekend itself, were widely and openly advertised in a variety of forums in the days and weeks preceding the G20 Summit. Although, as noted above, the police response from June 18-24 was in keeping with previous practice, albeit on a different scale, one notable addition was the deployment of the Community Relations Group (CRG) Activist/Protester Outreach Team which was tasked with initiating dialogue with key event organizers to promote events that would be viewed by both protesters and police as safe and successful. This outreach team was most directly and positively involved with the organizers of the Indigenous Sovereignty rally that took place June 24.

2.2 Black Bloc Tactics

As the "Black Bloc" played a central role in the violence and disorder of the G20 Summit weekend in Toronto, it is necessary to clarify what is meant and understood by the term.

The Black Bloc is not an organization; rather, it is a tactic. The tactic typically involves individuals infiltrating peaceful demonstrations with the intent of using the larger group as cover and concealment for disruptive and criminal activities.

For the purposes of this report, when the terms "Black Bloc members", "Black Bloc group", and "the Black Bloc" are utilized, they are understood to refer to those individuals and groups of individuals apparently engaged in one or more of the tactics or behaviours described below.

Black Bloc members either arrive at a demonstration already in black clothing or at some point change into black clothing. Black Bloc members cover their faces using balaclavas, ski masks, handkerchiefs, or other items, before taking part in criminal actions such as destruction of property. The uniform look makes it difficult to identify those responsible for the criminality since virtually all persons in the Black Bloc look significantly alike. As circumstances dictate, Black Bloc members can change out of their black clothing into less conspicuous attire in order to melt into the crowd and lessen scrutiny by the police. Returning to 'street clothing' is accomplished by surrounding those changing and using banners and umbrellas to shield identification attempts by police.

The above-described tactics were first used by German protesters in the 1980s to allow them to better resist the police and elude identification. The German media labeled them "*der schwarze block*" (the black block). Since that time the tactic has spread across Europe and to North America and has become a common feature of large-scale international gatherings. The motivation behind particular manifestations of the Black Bloc tactic varies depending on the nature of the event in question and the ideology of those involved.

2.3 Friday, June 25, 2010

The Days of Action planned to coincide with the three day period of the G8/G20 Summits, June 25-27, commenced in Toronto on June 25 with several events. The most significant of these was a combined Free the Streets march, block party and tent city organized under the heading of Justice for Our Communities, commencing at Allan Gardens at 2:30 pm. Also part of the day's agenda was a Shout Out for Global Justice event scheduled to start at 7:00 pm at Massey Hall. In addition to G20 Summit-related events, three World Cup soccer matches and a Toronto Jazz Festival concert at Nathan Phillips Square were taking place. As well, a daily protest by the Falun Dafa Association at the Chinese consulate and at Queen's Park, and a Toronto Hotel Workers Strike and Community Rally at the Novotel Hotel, one block from the Security Zone, were scheduled to occur.

There were concerns about public order and criminal activity in relation to the financial district in the early morning hours (6:00-7:00 am), as well as later in the day at the Allan Gardens events. Similar concerns existed with regard to a "critical mass" bicycle ride meeting at Bloor Street and Spadina Avenue at 6:00 pm, and the Shout Out for Global Justice event at Massey Hall.

At 1:30 pm, information was received in the MICC that approximately 100 protesters at Allan Gardens were putting on masks and that Ontario Coalition Against Poverty members were

forming up at their nearby office. In response, Public Order Unit (POU) sections were directed to move to positions in the vicinity of Allan Gardens and CRU bicycle officers conducted mobile patrols. Also at this time, a Crime Stoppers tip was received about a woman with bombs hidden in her house who intended to use them against the G20 Summit security fence or a foreign consulate. On Grenville Street at the rear of TPS Headquarters, a crowd began gathering for the repatriation ceremony for fallen Canadian soldier Sgt. James MacNeil.

At 2:00 pm, information was received in the MICC indicating that there were now 250 people in Allan Gardens and that the route of the march starting there, although not known with certainty, might go through the financial district downtown. Some protesters were observed with bags of vinegar (a home-made defense against tear gas) and wearing knee pads, while still others were mothers with babies.

At 2:20 pm, information was received that 30 Black Bloc members were in the PATH system and that the Black Bloc planned to take over several identified sectors of the PATH later in the afternoon. As a result, the PATH system was placed in 'soft lockdown' and POU sections were staged in the vicinity of Adelaide Street and Yonge Street.

At Allan Gardens, four buses believed to be from Montreal arrived and began disembarking passengers. Information was received about the possible arrival in Toronto of 50 buses carrying members of the Sri Lankan community from the United States. The protesters assembling at Allan Gardens were now estimated to number at least 500, with some wearing helmets and bandanas. Officers seized numerous weapons from individuals entering the park.

At 2:43 pm, a CRU bike team intercepted a group of individuals with hard hats, bandanas, and hammers at Union Station. At Yonge and Carlton Streets approximately 30 individuals with bandanas and black and red flags on sticks were observed. A number of buses were observed in the area of TPS Headquarters, located at 40 College Street, dropping off protesters who then made their way in small groups to Allan Gardens. TPS Headquarters was locked down as a precaution, as were the gates at the IZ security fence where a section of Mounted Unit officers was also requested.

Just before 3:00 pm, the MICC advised officers in the field that protesters at Allan Gardens were loading their backpacks with stones, bricks, and fluids and that officers should be prepared to deploy gas masks. The protest march then began to form up facing westbound on Carlton Street, with officers providing an escort and preparing to clear the route of vehicular traffic. Some protesters remained in Allan Gardens at this point. Substantial sections of the PATH system were placed in full lockdown at the direction of building management. As the march assembled, additional buses were observed circling TPS Headquarters apparently looking for places to drop off protesters.

Field commanders indicated they planned to lead the march once it started and directed that POU officers would be deployed if and when protesters engaged with officers. Possible sightings of Black Bloc members were reported in the vicinity of First Canadian Place and the entire PATH system was placed in full lockdown at the direction of building management.

Officers spoke with the drivers of three buses from Montreal stopped near 30 Carlton Street. The buses were empty of their passengers, who had dispersed along Carlton Street, but officers seized a number of sticks from the buses.

At 3:25 pm, there were an estimated 1000 protesters in Allan Gardens with. Among them was a group dressed as clowns who were observed dipping handkerchiefs and other items of clothing in vinegar. Approximately 30 Black Bloc members were observed in the middle of the assembled protesters putting on masks and balaclavas.

At 3:45 pm, protesters formed a line in the middle of Carlton Street north of Allan Gardens. They were uncooperative with officers on scene and refused to indicate their direction of travel. A few moments later the lead elements of the group began moving westbound on Carlton Street towards Jarvis Street. Black Bloc members were observed carrying hammers in their pockets, which were believed to be for the purpose of smashing windows and causing various other types of property damage.

In the event that protesters made a concerted move towards the security fence, field commanders were informed by the MICC that protesters were not to be allowed south of Queen Street. Protesters would be so warned via the LRAD.

At 4:10 pm, a fire in a food court washroom at the Eaton Centre forced the evacuation of 1500 people onto the street at Yonge and Dundas Streets.

The Free the Streets march continued at a slow pace westbound on Carlton Street towards Church Street. The decision was made not to guide or force the march in any particular direction but rather to see where it would go of its own accord. Black Bloc members were observed clustered together behind a black flag in the centre of the crowd, which was chanting "Bomb the RBC." Bike officers were lined up on the north side of Carlton Street at Yonge Street to prevent the march from interfering with the imminent repatriation ceremony on Grenville Street. A number of POU sections were staged in the area of TPS Headquarters as it was felt it to be a likely target.

At 4:30 pm, 160 anti-Chinese government protesters left the Chinese consulate and started making their way to Queen's Park.

As the Free the Streets march approached Yonge Street, Black Bloc members were observed sending text messages, possibly planning or coordinating strategy, and information was received that Molotov cocktails were in the possession of protesters. As a result, all officers in the area were directed to put their helmets on and POU sections prepared for deployment.

At 4:42 pm, the front of the parade reached TPS Headquarters, just east of Bay Street. Both POU and regular uniform officers began to be pushed by the crowd, including Black Bloc members, and squashed against the wall of storefronts on the south side of College Street, just west of Yonge Street. The Black Bloc group in the centre of the march surrounded themselves with a very large black banner which effectively concealed them from view in all directions save from above. At the same time, the smell of smoke was detected coming from the crowd, leading to the fear that the Molotov cocktails already observed or other incendiary devices were about to be used. POU and Mounted sections were deployed in response and took up various positions in the immediate vicinity of TPS Headquarters.

At 4:51 pm, an "Assist Police Officer" call was issued by officers on the south side of College Street who were being overwhelmed and assaulted by the crowd. POU officers were immediately dispatched to this location and while en route a second "Assist" was issued.

The situation continued to deteriorate as protesters began to throw various projectiles, including glass bottles, unknown liquids, and bicycles at officers. The Black Bloc group put on gas masks in apparent preparation for further unlawful activity. As a result of the serious public disorder occurring as part of the march, additional units were deployed closer to the G20 Summit site and dayshift officers about to report off duty were directed to remain at or return to their posts.

At 4:59 pm, the repatriation procession bearing the body of Sgt. James MacNeil arrived at the Coroner's Office directly behind TPS Headquarters. The repatriation was concluded successfully without incident or disturbance.

In front of TPS Headquarters, College Street was extremely congested with the crowd filling all lanes of traffic and the sidewalks on both sides of the street.

At 5:10 pm there was a melee between officers and protesters in front of TPS Headquarters. A few moments later, more Black Bloc members were observed masking up and putting on goggles. A number of them also began to mix unknown liquids or chemicals in plastic bags and glass jars, producing black smoke. A bomb disposal team was mobilized to respond to this threat if necessary.

The Free the Streets march continued westbound on College Street, past Bay Street and towards University Avenue. Its continuing route remained unknown and field commanders were directed by the MICC to deny protesters access to the Gardiner Expressway and Don Valley Parkway should they try to take the march onto either or both of those highways.

At University Avenue the protesters turned and went southbound in the northbound lanes, partly of their own volition and partly at the direction of officers. The Black Bloc group could be seen moving about inside the main body of protesters, using the other crowd members as both a physical and visual barrier. Individuals in the crowd were seen with a flaming device of some sort.

Shortly after 5:30 pm, the march began spilling over into the southbound lanes of University Avenue as well. Bike officers supported by several POU sections took up a position across University Avenue at Elm Street to prevent protesters from getting any closer to the G20 Summit site. Additional POU sections were deployed further south at University Avenue and King Street West.

At 5:42 pm, Black Bloc members were seen arming themselves with bricks and rocks in the area of University Avenue and Gerrard Street West. In response, Mounted officers were directed to get themselves and their horses out of throwing range and POU sections were directed to deploy in 'hard tac' with helmets and shields and to bring the LRAD. The bike officers at Elm Street were removed for their own safety and replaced with POU officers. Black Bloc members were also seen mixing unknown liquids together out front of Sick Kids Hospital.

At 5:53 pm, Black Bloc members were observed urinating into pop bottles in apparent preparation for something. Accordingly, POU sections began putting on gas masks as it was felt that the use of gas was imminent. Just a few moments later though, a black balloon rose up in the air in the middle of the Black Bloc group and they began changing into regular clothing.

As a result of the violent and disorderly behaviour displayed by many protesters to this point, nearby 52 Division and the gates in the security fence were locked down, as were several of the

hospitals on University Avenue. As a further precaution, officers deployed within the secure zone were directed to line the fence on the inside.

At 6:00 pm, the protesters began moving westbound on Elm Street but were prevented from going south on either Simcoe Street or St. Patrick Street. In apparent response, they began breaking off in small groups, trying to get officers to chase them down side streets. The march gradually continued west on Elm Street and then north on McCaul Street. POU sections were moved to TPS Headquarters in anticipation of the march making its way back eastbound on College Street.

At 6:38 pm, the critical mass bike ride set off northbound Spadina Avenue from Bloor Street West. The MICC directed that the bike riders would be allowed to go where they wanted and to mix with the protest march but would not be allowed any access to highways. Mobile units were assigned to cover on-ramps to the Gardiner Expressway.

The Free the Streets march proceeded eastbound on College Street from McCaul Street and eventually passed TPS Headquarters without incident. At 6:48 pm, a school bus was investigated on Gerrard Street West after it was observed to be full of sticks and other apparent protest-related items.

After the protesters passed TPS Headquarters, a discussion ensued between field commanders and commanders in the MICC about the necessity of locking down the building. The decision to lock down the building was made by the MICC but some field commanders felt that they were in a better position to evaluate and respond to the situation on the ground. Concerns were also expressed about the very congested radio traffic experienced during the day and the resulting difficulties in transmitting important information. It was suggested that the assignment of radio channels be revised as it was not a technical problem with the radio system but rather a case of too many users in a single talkgroup.

The majority of protesters made their way back to Allan Gardens where officers monitored them from a distance. The critical mass bike ride was also monitored as it continued to make its way through various areas of the city but did not get onto either the Gardiner Expressway or the Don Valley Parkway. Approximately 500 protesters settled in at Allan Gardens for the evening without incident and a large but peaceful group of people who had attended the Shout Out for Global Justice event at Massey Hall later took to the downtown streets for a short time.

2.4 Saturday, June 26, 2010

Saturday, June 26 was the second of three planned Days of Action associated with the G8/G20 Summits. In Toronto, there were a number of events scheduled to take place in the downtown core involving a diverse range of causes, communities and issues. Some sought to capitalize on the presence of particular political leaders at the G20 Summit. More broadly-based demonstrations were organized in opposition to perceived problems with financial, environmental, and other policies espoused by the G8/G20 countries. A third category of protest sentiment took issue with the existence of the G8/G20 system and, indeed, with the very forms and structures of government in place in the G8/G20 countries.

The primary event on June 26 was the People First! We Deserve Better G8 & G20 Public Rally and March, scheduled to start at Queen's Park at 1:00 pm. Coordinated largely by organized labour, this event was billed as a peaceful, family-friendly rally at Queen's Park followed by a

march through the downtown core (University Avenue to Queen Street West to Spadina Avenue to College Street) which would eventually return to Queen's Park. Police officers assigned to the CRG Activist/Protester Outreach Team had worked extensively with the rally organizers beforehand and would be present with them during the event itself.

Using the People First march as cover, a much more militant event was planned to coincide with it. The Get Off The Fence event was openly advertised as a "confrontational, anti-colonial, anti-capitalist convergence in solidarity with the People's First Demonstration, 26 June 2010, 1 pm, Queen's Park, And then onwards to the Fence."² Another militant event scheduled for late Saturday night and overnight into Sunday was the Saturday Night Fever Radical Street Party.³

In the early hours of Saturday, police assigned to G20 Summit duties took up their posts and began preparing for the day ahead.

A Somali-Oromo community demonstration was planned for 10:00 am at Bloor Street West and St. George Street and was expected to involve 1500 to 2000 peaceful protesters.

At 12:00 pm, a commanders meeting was held at which certain information pertaining to the upcoming events was received. Commanders were advised that Black Bloc members on bicycles might take the lead during the march and that regular uniform officers were not to intervene if this occurred. It was believed that these individuals planned to go southbound on University Avenue right down to the security fence surrounding the G20 Summit site. Information provided to POU sections was to expect the worst, such as golf balls and hatchets, from splinter groups who might not be dressed in black again this day as a result of testing the police response yesterday.

At 12:10 pm, a GO train conductor overheard a group of young people discussing an attack on the security fence. The group had large backpacks and frozen water bottles with them.

Officers at Union Station reported that a small number of individuals had tried to get to the security fence from there. A short time later, a separate group of five people with gas masks and make-shift weapons made of rolled-up coins were observed at Union Station.

At 12:12 pm, a 51 Division sergeant advised that protesters in the Church Street and Wellesley Street East area were planning to vandalize buildings there in order to distract officers and draw police resources away from Queen's Park.

At 12:30 pm, an officer from the Mounted Unit advised that five people were seen leaving the area of Queen Street West and Noble Street after loading ropes with grappling hooks attached into duffel bags. The individuals left on foot and bicycle heading eastbound towards downtown.

At 12:38 pm, 300 student protesters temporarily blocked the intersection of Spadina Avenue and Bloor Street West.

At 12:43 pm, security at College Park advised police of a group of males in the pathway at 777 Bay Street wearing shin-pads and carrying heavy bags.

² Toronto Community Mobilization Network. <http://g20.torontomobilize.org/getoffthefence> (April 15, 2010)

³ Ibid.

At 12:49 pm, information was received in the MICC that at least six people were arrested at Union Station and that sticks, rocks, golf balls, and frozen water bottles had been seized from them.

At 12:55 pm, six to ten protesters dressed in black were observed near Trinity Square, behind 483 Bay Street, preparing Molotov cocktails. Officers were dispatched to this location and a number of individuals were arrested.

At 12:57 pm, there were an estimated 6000 people gathered at Queen's Park. This was in addition to a large group further south in front of the United States consulate and various groups converging on the area by foot.

The POU officers deployed in support of the day's events were broken down into five sections. The primary POU deployment was along Richmond Street West to prevent demonstrators from getting to the security fence surrounding the G20 Summit site.

At 1:02 pm, several individuals were arrested at University Avenue and Dundas Street West in possession of incendiary devices.

By 1:13 pm, there were an estimated 7000-10,000 people at Queen's Park.

At 1:22 pm, 50 Black Bloc members were observed in the crowd at Queen's Park. At the same time approximately 1000 demonstrators from the U.S. consulate were making their way northbound on University Avenue from that location and a number of people with weapons were seen moving into Queen's Park.

At 1:27 pm, all POU officers were ordered by the MICC to be in "hard tac" and to remain in their vehicles until otherwise directed.

At 1:30 pm, a crowd estimated at 10,000 people moved off the lawns at Queen's Park into both the northbound and southbound lanes of University Avenue, commencing the People First march. (See Appendix E)

Immediately, 40-50 demonstrators were observed putting on gas masks while another 100 entered the subway system at the Queen's Park station. Black Bloc members in the crowd were observed stripping the signs off the sticks they were carrying.

At 1:48 pm, the front of the march reached Dundas Street West.

At 1:51 pm, all POU sections were ordered to deploy onto Richmond Street West in "hard tac".

At 1:53 pm, another group of 100 Black Bloc members was observed at University Avenue and College Street donning masks and wearing helmets, goggles, and ear pieces. This group of Black Bloc joined the main body of the march in groups of 10-20, not all at once, and spaced themselves out so that there was a gap of several hundred metres between them.

At 1:57 pm, the front of the march turned onto westbound Queen Street West. Black Bloc members were at the rear of the crowd in several groups and some were observed wearing helmets with red crosses on them, indicating that they were "medics."

Starting at 2:00 pm, there were numerous reports of Black Bloc efforts to disrupt and take over the march. Black Bloc members were observed detaching themselves from the main body of marchers and sprinting ahead on sidewalks and down side streets.

At 2:05 pm, the TTC shut down some subway and bus service in the downtown core. POU commanders were advised by the MICC at this point that they were authorized to use the LRAD if necessary.

At 2:10 pm, while some Black Bloc members were reported running westbound Queen Street West at St. Patrick Street, 300 more were congregated towards the rear of the march at University Avenue and Dundas Street West.

At 2:15 pm, a large group of Black Bloc members were reported at the intersection of Spadina Avenue and Queen Street West where a number of them were confronted by other protesters. POU and Mounted Unit sections were deployed to this intersection in response.

At 2:20 pm, the front of the march was moving northbound on Spadina Avenue at Sullivan Street while the rear was at University Avenue just south of Dundas Street West. Queen Street West was fully occupied by protesters along its length from University Avenue to Spadina Avenue, with Black Bloc members in pockets throughout.

At 2:29 pm, the police line at Queen Street West and John Street was breached by an aggressive crowd. The bike and foot officers present there gave way as per earlier direction not to confront protesters if overwhelmed. POU officers just south on Richmond Street West were immediately engaged by the protesters who began throwing projectiles at them. Additional POU resources were moved to Richmond Street West and John Street in support.

At 2:33 pm, a number of people were observed on the roof of a building at the northeast corner of Spadina Avenue and Queen Street West, apparently acting as "spotters" for the crowd.

At 2:39 pm, 40-50 protesters who had covered their faces got behind the police line at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue and moved south towards the POU officers at Richmond Street West. They were followed within five minutes by a crowd of 1000-1500 protesters who broke off from the main march heading north on Spadina Avenue and went south instead.

At 2:47 pm, POU officers began to be attacked at Richmond Street West and Spadina Avenue. Golf balls, paint, urine, tomatoes, umbrellas, and rocks were thrown at them by the crowd.

At 2:49 pm, a male protester on the east side of Spadina Avenue just south of Queen Street West was observed preparing Molotov cocktails.

At 2:56 pm, an OPP POU section at Spadina Avenue just north of Richmond Street West requested assistance due to the intensity of the assault being made on their position. Numerous projectiles were launched at them, including glass bottles containing unknown liquids.

At 2:58 pm, several Black Bloc members were observed mixing up unknown liquids in a bus shelter at 161 Spadina Avenue.

At 3:00 pm, the front of the main march was coming up to Queen's Park Circle while the tail end was at Queen Street West and Peter Street.

At 3:03 pm, due to the deteriorating situation on the ground, a request was made to redeploy OPP officers assigned to G8 Summit duties in Huntsville to Toronto.

At 3:04 pm, a large amount of smoke and some flames began emanating from the crowd at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue, variously reported as coming from flares, fireworks, or incendiary devices. In response, the MICC directed POU officers on scene to put on their gas masks. The MICC further directed that all bike officers were to be removed from the area of Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue for their safety.

At 3:06 pm, people in the crowd were observed putting on their own gas masks. At the same time, POU officers deployed tear gas into the crowd on Spadina Avenue between Richmond Street West and Queen Street West.

At 3:11 pm, a large group of Black Bloc members, evidently realizing they were not going to get to the security fence, began running eastbound on Queen Street West back in the direction the march had come from.

At 3:12 pm, an assist police officer call was issued by officers near 415 Queen Street West who were attacked by Black Bloc members throwing rocks at them and their police vehicles. Three individuals dressed in black jumped on the hood of a police car being operated by an officer and smashed the driver's side window with a wooden pole, hitting the officer in the head. He was assisted out of his car by other officers and was then surrounded along with the other officers by an extremely hostile crowd throwing bottles, fluids and rocks and chanting "Whose streets? Our streets!"

In a laneway just north of this location, 10-15 Black Bloc members were observed reaching into backpacks. The individuals on the rooftop of the building at the northeast corner of Spadina Avenue and Queen Street West continued in their apparent role of acting as 'spotters' for the crowd.

At 3:15 pm, a large group of Black Bloc members made their way east to Soho Street and then went north, possibly towards Grange Park. Bike officers were directed not to engage these individuals at this time and after bike units were surrounded near Queen Street West and Soho Street, all bike officers were ordered out of the area.

At 3:18 pm, information was received that the officers at 415 Queen Street West who had been overrun by retreating Black Bloc members continued to be surrounded on all sides by a large and hostile crowd. At the same time, information was received that some Black Bloc members were damaging banks located on Queen Street West closer to University Avenue. Non-POU officers were again directed by the MICC not to engage the violent protesters and to stay out of the affected areas.

At 3:20 pm, a POU section was deployed to extract the officers trapped at 415 Queen Street West.

Also at 3:20 pm, officers at the rear of 338 Richmond Street West requested POU support at that location and relayed information about individuals filling up Molotov cocktails with gasoline on Spadina Avenue. No POU resources were available and the officers were directed to disengage for their own safety. The MICC also directed CRU bike officers, once all were accounted for, to move away from and stay north of the mass of violent protesters.

At 3:21 pm, reports that Black Bloc members were attacking additional banks and a number of retail outlets on Queen Street West were received. One business owner reporting his store vandalized advised that protesters smashed his windows and then entered the store armed with metal bars and tear gas. Another retailer advised the Black Bloc members broke into her store and set off tear gas.

At 3:27 pm, the surrounded officers at 415 Queen Street West requested urgent POU support as the crowd encircling them was getting more agitated. POU officers arrived within minutes and the situation was stabilized though the crowd remained hostile and non-compliant.

By 3:30 pm, hundreds of members of the Black Bloc had made their way to the area of Old City Hall at 60 Queen Street West and had then gone southbound on Bay Street from that location, throwing rocks through storefront windows and causing widespread, serious damage as they went.

At 3:37 pm, Black Bloc members attacked two police cars at the intersection of King Street West and Bay Street, forcing the officers operating them to flee for their safety. One of the cars was almost immediately set on fire while the other was severely damaged. An "Assist Police Officer" call was issued by officers on scene. Molotov cocktails, hammers, and an axe were among the weapons in the crowd at this point.

At 3:41 pm, in response to the unprecedented violence of the protesters, all non-POU officers were withdrawn from the area of King Street West from Bay Street to Yonge Street. Protesters continued to damage the abandoned police cars at King Street West and Bay Street, throwing rocks and other projectiles at them and filming the spectacle. A Black Bloc member was observed with a police jacket stolen from one of the cars.

At 3:50 pm, in reaction to police deployment on the south and west sides of the intersection of King Street West and Bay Street, some of the crowd went eastbound on King Street West towards Yonge Street while others went back northbound on Bay Street and then east on Adelaide Street West towards Yonge.

At 3:51 pm, another assist police officer call was issued, this one by officers on Yonge Street between King Street and Adelaide Street. Attempts were made by protesters to break into the locked-down TTC King subway station. Non-POU officers were again ordered to withdraw from the area of King and Yonge Streets.

The protesters at King Street and Yonge Street then went northbound on Yonge and merged with the group coming from Adelaide Street West.

At 3:54 pm, reports were received of Black Bloc members running at police officers with baseball bats.

At 3:55 pm, non-POU officers from OZ South were deployed along Richmond Street West to free up POU sections to redeploy further north.

At 3:57 pm, all non-POU officers from OZ North were directed to stay off Yonge Street and to make their way to Queen's Park.

At 4:00 pm, the POU section at Richmond Street West and Spadina Avenue reported they were still faced with a large crowd of protesters, with pyrotechnic devices and unknown weapons, and thus were not available to be deployed elsewhere.

At 4:01 pm, a second police car was set on fire at King Street West and Bay Street.

At 4:03 pm, the officers trapped at 415 Queen Street West advised that, while POU officers had formed a protective cordon around them, the crowd now tightly surrounded all the officers there, including the POU, and would not let them move in any direction.

At 4:05 pm, POU sections from King Street West and Bay Street were moved to Yonge Street and Queen.

By 4:08 pm, the violent protesters on Yonge Street were at Dundas Street and continuing to move north. They were armed with sticks and hammers and were breaking storefront windows all along the street. This group was an estimated 1000 strong.

At 4:12 pm, the POU sections on Yonge Street south of the Black Bloc group began following, while additional POU sections were directed to go to Yonge Street and Gerrard Street, north of the group's location, to head it off and contain it with the assistance of the officers coming up from the south.

By 4:15 pm, the fast-moving protesters had already made it to Yonge Street and Gerrard Street, so the POU sections originally assigned there were redirected to TPS Headquarters. A number of Mounted Unit horses were stationed on Yonge Street at Wellington Street while others were deployed to Bay Street at College Street.

At 4:17 pm, all the officers trapped at 415 Queen Street West were extracted after more than an hour of being surrounded by an angry and obstructive crowd. After the extraction, the crowd engulfed the two police cars there, jumping on their roof tops and smashing and kicking the vehicles. A quantity of police property was also stolen from inside the vehicles. The POU sections involved in the extraction were now available for redeployment.

At 4:18 pm, information was received that POU officers at Queen Street West and Spadina had made a number of arrests and had seized gasoline and other accelerants from the arrested individuals.

At 4:19 pm, TTC Wheeltrans officials advised they were trying to get five patients into Toronto General Hospital for kidney dialysis treatment but were unable due to the unsafe conditions in the downtown area. Toronto General Hospital staff tried to make alternative arrangements for the patients.

Also at 4:19 pm, a large crowd began moving south on Bay Street towards King Street West at the same time as the Black Bloc group on Yonge Street was continuing northbound towards College Street.

By 4:26 pm, the Black Bloc was westbound on College Street from Yonge Street, smashing windows of retail stores and throwing projectiles at TPS Headquarters, which was protected by POU officers.

At 4:29 pm, all available officers were directed to move to the area of Avenue Road and Bloor Street West, just north of Queen's Park.

At 4:30 pm, 400 non-violent protesters were at King Street West and Bay Street and were being prevented from going any further south by about 100 police officers.

At 4:34 pm, 2 individuals were investigated after being discovered texting others about perceived weaknesses in the security fence at a point near Union Station.

At 4:36 pm, a police car on Queen Street West east of Spadina Avenue was set on fire.

At 4:38 pm, 200 Black Bloc members were westbound on College Street almost at University Avenue. POU units were deployed to contain them at this location.

At 4:39 pm, another crowd began forming at Simcoe Street and Queen Street West.

At 4:40 pm, POU officers at the intersection of University Avenue and College Street were attacked by Black Bloc members and pelted with sticks and rocks. Property damage continued as well with signs being smashed at this location. Additional POU sections were moved to the area in support and tear gas was deployed.

At 4:42 pm, Black Bloc members began running northbound to Queen's Park and some changed out of their black clothing into less conspicuous attire. CRU bike officers assisted the POU sections with the clearing of the intersection.

At 4:46 pm, a very large, militant crowd of protesters moved southbound on Bay Street towards King Street West. Within minutes an "Assist Police Officer" call was issued and POU officers were deployed in support.

At 4:53 pm, information was received that protesters at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue were in the process of setting a second police car on fire.

Field commanders advised they were having difficulty containing the protesters due to their greater mobility. After the deployment of officers in a particular location, the crowd would move, splinter off, and then double back.

Complicating the situation for field commanders and the MICC was the virtually unprecedented situation of having to consider the physical safety of large numbers of non-POU officers who possessed neither the full range of less-lethal use of force options nor the specialized protective equipment required to safely challenge riotous demonstrators. The MICC made the decision to use tactical disengagement as the safest option for both the officers and the demonstrators at large. Wherever it was possible to safely do so, CRU bike officers relieved properly equipped POU sections so they could be redeployed where most needed.

At 5:07 pm, officers at King Street West and University Avenue advised they were being surrounded by crowds and needed more officers at their location.

At 5:10 pm, officers just north on University Avenue at Adelaide Street West issued another "Assist Police Officer" call as they were swarmed by a crowd of protesters. POU officers were once again deployed in support.

At 5:13 pm, protesters at the front of Queen's Park were observed going northbound wearing gas masks.

At 5:17 pm, pepper spray was deployed at Queen's Park, a number of arrests began to be made, and some of the crowd dispersed.

At 5:18 pm, a contingency plan began to be developed to get peaceful protesters out of the city.

At 5:20 pm, Black Bloc members were observed at 144 College Street changing back into their black clothes and putting gas masks on.

At Queen's Park, all non-POU officers were directed to stay behind the POU officers who would be the first to engage the protesters.

At 5:28 pm, the MICC ordered TPS officers deployed within the IZ to redeploy to the OZ. RCMP officers took over duties within the IZ as a result.

At 5:31 pm, large crowds of protesters were at Adelaide Street West and Bay Street, King Street West and Bay Street, and Queen's Park where there were at least 2000 people. Preparations were made for the LRAD to be used to assist in dispersing the crowd gathered at Queen's Park.

At 5:43 pm, a large crowd began heading eastbound on College Street from University Avenue towards TPS Headquarters. Personnel there were directed to board up as many windows as possible.

At 5:46 pm, the LRAD was used at Queen's Park and the following message broadcast twice: "Disperse or be arrested." A number of individuals did heed the warning and began moving from the area.

At 5:52 pm, police received a call regarding a person with a gun at Isabella Street east of Yonge Street. ETF officers were assigned to respond to this call.

At 5:53 pm, the crowd at Queen's Park became non-compliant again, sitting down where they were and refusing to leave. Within a few minutes they became aggressive towards police and preparations were made for arrests to start.

At 5:55 pm, the crowd at Adelaide Street West and Bay Street was estimated at 1000-1500 and growing fast.

At 5:57 pm, the OPP officers mobilized to Toronto from Huntsville were called out from their staging area and deployed.

At 5:59 pm, a second police car was set on fire on Queen Street West east of Spadina Avenue, the fourth police car burned in less than two and a half hours.

At 6:01 pm, an aggressive and violent crowd rushed the police at Queen's Park, advancing on prisoner transport wagons and throwing projectiles including water bottles, sticks, and rocks at officers. Pepper spray was again deployed in response.

At 6:03 pm, the earlier person with a gun call was updated with information that a male armed with a rifle was on Isabella Street walking towards Yonge Street.

At 6:07 pm, protesters southbound on Yonge Street were observed attempting to flank officers by cutting over to Bay Street, possibly trying to get to the security fence. At Front Street and Yonge Street another crowd of protesters, this one with Black Bloc members in it, was walking northbound.

At Adelaide Street West and Bay Street, at Yonge Street and Gerrard Street, and at Queen's Park, amongst a number of other locations, attempts were made to contain large groups of protesters and limit their movements in order to prevent any further damage to public and private property. These efforts were hampered by both the rapidity with which the crowds were able to move, in comparison with large groups of police, and by the fact that police resources were spread out over multiple locations throughout the downtown core, making it difficult to assemble a sufficient number of officers to safely contain large and aggressive crowds.

At 6:15 pm, Mounted Unit officers were deployed to Queen Street West and Peter Street to assist with dispersing the crowd gathered around a burning police car. The fire was endangering a nearby building and shotgun rounds inside the car were being set off by the blaze.

At 6:26 pm, POU officers were deployed to Richmond Street West and Peter Street after bottles were thrown at officers there. The LRAD was used again at this location to warn the crowd to "disperse or be arrested".

At 6:38 pm, POU officers at Queen's Park advised there were still 2000 protesters holding fast at that location, with a core of approximately 200 protesters starting to confront and provoke officers. The majority of the crowd was on the east side of Queen's Park.

At 6:40 pm, an officer responding to an assist police officer call was hit in the head with a rock. The officer was transported to hospital with minor injuries.

At 6:43 pm, a crowd of 350 protesters was still at Queen Street West and Peter Street.

At 6:50 pm, CRU bike officers were deployed to University Avenue and Wellington Street in response to a large and unruly crowd gathering there.

At 6:52 pm, a number of Black Bloc members were reported to be at a University of Toronto building at 16 Bancroft Avenue. Officers were deployed there to investigate and attempt to identify suspects responsible for the violence and criminality of the day. The investigation did not result in any arrests at that time.

At 6:57 pm, the MICC advised field commanders that all protesters who refused to leave any area or were masked up would be moved or arrested for breach of the peace. No protesters would be allowed to remain on scene as of this point. The use of the LRAD was authorized to assist in the dispersal of protesters.

At 7:02 pm, information was received that an additional 700 OPP officers were en route from Huntsville to Toronto with an expected time of arrival of approximately 9:00 pm.

At 7:06 pm, POU officers began making arrests at Queen Street West and Peter Street.

At 7:14 pm, a large group of 200-250 Black Bloc members was observed coming up behind POU officers deployed at Queen's Park. Additional POU officers were deployed to that location in response.

At 7:22 pm, the crowd at Queen's Park was estimated at 3000 people.

At 7:35 pm, the MICC advised field commanders that protesters still present at various locations in the downtown area, who had not yet dispersed, were to be arrested for breach of the peace. Public order had to be restored before nightfall when the task would become much harder.

At 7:42 pm, OPP POU officers at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue were forced to stop arresting protesters in breach of the peace after they were surrounded, had bottles thrown at them, and one of their officers was injured. Additional POU officers were deployed in support.

At 7:51 pm, the area of Queen Street West and Peter Street was described as dynamic and not under control, with the crowd there armed with sticks. One minute later, reports were received of a police car set on fire at that location. Responding TFS units attending the fire requested a police escort for their safety, and the police unit so assigned was told to exit from the area as quickly as possible to avoid being targeted by rioters.

At 8:06 pm, commanders on the ground at Queen's Park advised the MICC that the protesters gathered there remained very non-compliant and only moved when forced to do so.

At 8:24 pm, POU commanders at Queen's Park advised they were pushing a crowd of 2000-3000 in a northwesterly direction towards Hoskin Avenue. Arrests were being made as necessary and as possible.

At 8:34 pm, POU commanders advised that their officers had been attacked by violent protesters on Hoskin Avenue. In response, the POU engaged the crowd and split it in two, with half being driven further west on Hoskin Avenue and half going north on Devonshire Place.

At 8:35 pm, commanders in the MICC requested a plan be drawn up immediately for a central location to act as a secure site for all police cars in the downtown core.

At 8:36 pm, a large crowd was reported on Bloor Street West and St. George Street, moving eastbound towards Avenue Road.

At 8:39 pm, information was received that Black Bloc members were trying to take over Bloor Street West at Bedford Road.

At 8:45 pm, POU officers were assigned to respond to protesters gathered in the area of the Novotel Hotel on The Esplanade. At the same time, information was received that the protesters on Bloor Street West might be planning to go to Yorkville with the intent of attacking particular retail businesses, as well as the many police vehicles parked in the area. Available units were sent to the area in response.

At 8:48 pm, POU sections were deployed to respond to the new threat in Yorkville but one section advised they were unable to redeploy because they were still facing a hostile crowd, including a male armed with a Molotov cocktail, on Queen Street West near Beverley Street.

At 9:06 pm, a POU section at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue advised there were still 1000 protesters at that location, too many to arrest with the resources available to them.

At 9:08 pm, the MICC assigned additional POU resources to the scene at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue with the direction to box the crowd and make arrests. POU sections began converging on the crowd in order to contain it and begin making arrests.

At 9:10 pm, a crowd of an estimated 1000 protesters was observed walking southbound on Yonge Street near Dundas Street. Available POU sections and other officers were deployed to Yonge Street in response.

At 9:18 pm, the crowd at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue began to disperse.

At 9:20 pm, the protesters on Yonge Street began vandalizing, looting, and setting fire to stores near Shuter Street. Information was received indicating that they intended to take over Dundas Square and then proceed to the security fence for a "finale." The MICC directed officers in the field that no protesters were to be allowed any further south on Yonge Street than King Street and resources were deployed to that location accordingly.

At 9:23 pm, large segments of the crowd from Yonge Street began moving westbound on Queen Street West and Adelaide Street West, away from Yonge Street.

At 9:27 pm, a POU section advised they were charging a crowd of protesters northbound on St. Patrick Street from Queen Street West.

At 9:28 pm, officers at King Street West and Bay Street advised that the crowd from Yonge Street had passed through that intersection and were continuing westbound on King Street West. One minute later this crowd was observed heading southbound on York Street towards Wellington Street West and the security fence.

At 9:30 pm, the above crowd, estimated at 1000-1500 people, made its way to the fence at Wellington Street West. POU sections and other officers were deployed between the protesters and the fence itself and the crowd did not engage the police at this time.

At 9:36 pm, POU sections were directed to sweep the crowd eastbound along the fence line, decreasing their proximity to the G20 Summit site.

At 9:40 pm, before the crowd of protesters could be pushed east and away from the fence, they began moving northbound away from Wellington Street West and into the financial district.

At 9:43 pm, the MICC directed that these protesters be locked down in the area bounded by Wellington Street West, York Street, King Street West, and Bay Street and that they be arrested once so contained.

Over the next few minutes, multiple POU sections were deployed to form a box around the protest crowd in the financial district.

At 9:49 pm, community relations officers were deployed to Yorkville to warn businesses of the possibility of vandalism and other criminality targeting their premises and to urge them to close for the evening if possible.

At 9:51 pm, POU officers advised that the crowd in the financial district was eastbound on King Street West towards Yonge Street, and had already moved east of Bay Street and out of the planned box.

By 9:57 pm, the above crowd was eastbound on King Street East heading towards Church Street.

At 10:00 pm, information was received about another large crowd in the same area, this one westbound on Front Street East at Yonge Street.

At 10:01 pm, POU officers at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue advised the intersection there had been cleared of protesters, a number of arrests had been made, and 250 protesters remained on Queen Street West just west of Spadina Avenue.

At 10:04 pm, the crowd on King Street East reached Church Street and direction was given to officers on the ground not to let the protesters go north, south, or any further east from that location.

At 10:10 pm, the crowd at Front Street and Yonge Street moved south on Yonge Street and then east on The Esplanade towards the Novotel Hotel and the other protesters already gathered there.

At 10:17 pm, a box was formed surrounding the protesters in the area of the Novotel. The contained area was bounded by Yonge Street, Front Street East, Church Street, and The Esplanade. By 10:26 pm, approximately 200 protesters were boxed in and the MICC advised field commanders that the protesters were to be arrested, not moved. Arrests began to be made within a few minutes.

At 10:38 pm, the POU officers at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue advised they had moved just west of Spadina Avenue to Cameron Street, and were now holding about 500 protesters at that location.

At 11:11 pm, POU officers at Queen Street West and Augusta Avenue advised that, although they had made numerous arrests, there were still 150 protesters at their location.

At 11:20 pm, 200 protesters were observed walking southbound on Church Street from Carlton Street. This group passed Gerrard Street East and continued south to Dundas Street East where it then turned and went eastbound. Members of the crowd had signs indicating they might be heading to the PPC at 629 Eastern Avenue.

By 11:31 pm, the protesters on Dundas Street East had passed Sherbourne Street and were approaching Parliament Street. CRU bike officers and POU sections attempted to stop and contain them at Dundas Street East and River Street but they scattered and ran through Regent Park. The protesters then emerged back onto River Street near Queen Street East where some sat down in the street and others splintered off to the south and west. Officers at the PPC were advised that protesters were potentially on their way to that location.

At 11:50 pm, POU officers at Queen Street West and Portland Street advised they were monitoring a crowd of 200 protesters located there.

At 11:53 pm, officers at the Novotel advised there were still 50-60 people to be arrested at that location.

2.5 Sunday, June 27, 2010 – Early Morning Hours

At 12:08 am, the officers at Queen Street East and River Street observed a group of 50 black-clad protesters making their way westbound from 370 King Street East. This group eventually went westbound on Adelaide Street East from Parliament Street.

At 12:17 am, POU officers at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue advised the MICC that there were still 300-500 protesters at their location. The MICC was further advised that the crowd rushed the POU officers when they tried to leave the area and were presently throwing rocks and bottles at them. Additional POU sections as well as CRU bike teams were deployed in response.

At 12:24 am, protesters began arriving at the PPC,

At 12:50 am, the MICC was advised that the crowd at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue had been dispersed.

At 1:07 am, the protesters at the PPC were described as noisy but peaceful.

At 1:40 am, individuals were observed in the area of Queen Street East and Jones Avenue, a few blocks east of the PPC, crawling out of the sewers onto the street.

At 1:57 am, the protesters at the PPC were advised they must disperse from the area and that they had five minutes to do so. Most of the crowd moved off westbound but approximately 30 individuals chose not to leave and were arrested.

2.6 Sunday, June 27, 2010

Sunday, June 27 was the final day of the G20 Summit in Toronto. In keeping with the first two days, a number of diverse events had been planned for the third day of the Days of Action. These included "autonomous direct actions," a critical mass Bike Block action, a prayer vigil, and an anti-prison demonstration called Fire.Works.For.Prisons.⁴

At approximately 7:00 am, POU officers on general patrol in the area of the University of Toronto were approached and provided with information about the presence of a large group of Black Bloc members in a building on campus. Based on the information they received and their own subsequent investigation, the officers arrested 113 people at this location and transported them to the Prisoner Processing Centre (PPC) at 629 Eastern Avenue for investigation. (See Appendix D)

At 9:01 am, a variety of weapons including bricks, bottles, and golf balls were found hidden in bushes and shrubbery around Queen's Park and the University of Toronto.

At 10:47 am, there were approximately 100 protesters on scene at Jimmy Simpson Park, a Toronto park located a few blocks from the PPC at 629 Eastern Avenue.

⁴ Toronto Community Mobilization Network. <http://g20.torontomobilize.org/getoffthefence> (April 15, 2010)

At 12:46 pm, a number of individuals were arrested in Yorkville. They were discovered to have in their possession maps detailing protest information from the previous day, as well as information indicating that buses would be at Dufferin Grove Park at 4:00 p.m. today to pick them up. Dufferin Grove Park is located on the east side of Dufferin Street midway between Bloor Street West and College Street.

At 1:07 pm, 52 Division officers arrested two individuals at Dundas Street West and Beverley Street with fuel and empty bottles.

At 1:53 pm, 50 Black Bloc members were reported at Queen Street West and Beverley Street and officers were dispatched to that location. A few minutes later a POU section advised that three people there had been arrested in possession of Molotov cocktails.

At 2:01 pm, a group participating in a prayer vigil assembled at King Street East and Church Street. Within a short period of time this group started to make its way westbound on King Street and then southbound on Bay Street.

At 2:04 pm, more information was received indicating that a number of school buses would be at Dufferin Grove Park at 4:00 pm to pick up protesters to leave. Similar information was received again at 2:40 pm.

At 2:25 pm, information was received that a map was located in an arrested individual's possession indicating where to rush the security fence to get to the G20 Summit site.

At 2:51 pm, the group at King Street West and Bay Street started a sit-in at that location after being denied permission to go to the security fence. The group numbered about 80 people at this point.

At 3:05 pm, information was received that approximately 100 protesters and media representatives were at 1266 Queen Street West (Queen Street West at Noble Street), possibly as part of a press conference being held by the 'Bike Block' group.

At 3:34 pm, POU officers advised that a large number of protesters were now at King Street West and Bay Street and that a second group had formed behind the original prayer vigil group.

At 3:36 pm, officers on scene at Queen Street West and Noble Street advised a number of individuals there were being investigated and arrested. A quantity of unknown liquids, gas masks, black clothing, and bandanas was found at this location.

At 3:54 pm, another demonstration began to form at King Street West and Noble Street. The crowd there numbered approximately 100, and by 3:59 pm arrests were being made at that location.

At 4:10 pm, the ETF was dispatched to Queen Street West and Cowan Avenue to investigate a bus from Montreal containing a large amount of chemicals.

At 4:19 pm, the protest group at King Street West and Bay Street had grown considerably in size and attracted a number of spectators. Field commanders felt that the deployment of POU officers in "hard tac" at this location was responsible for making the crowd significantly larger. When field commanders requested the POU officers stand down they were informed that the

POU would only take direction from the MICC and that their current direction was to remain at King and Bay.

At 4:48 pm, information was received that approximately 80 people were at Jimmy Simpson Park and that a small number of them had been arrested. Officers were also investigating a number of individuals with makeshift chemicals in bottles.

By 4:54 pm, the protest group at King Street West and Bay Street had grown in size as other groups, including 50-100 cyclists, joined it. At this point the crowd was estimated as 700 people, with 15-20 Black Bloc members in it.

At 5:01 pm, the crowd at King Street West and Bay Street began moving north on Bay Street towards Queen Street West.

At 5:05 pm, officers reported finding lighter fluid, sticks, and bags in the yards of houses on Logan Avenue, just east of Jimmy Simpson Park.

At 5:10 pm, POU officers at Jimmy Simpson Park advised that they, CRU bike officers, and plainclothes officers had a number of Black Bloc members in custody at that location. Other than the discovery of incendiary devices near the rail lines bordering the park at 5:25 pm, no further events of significance occurred at this location.

At 5:12 pm, field commanders accompanying the crowd from King and Bay advised the MICC that the intention of the crowd was to go to Dufferin Grove Park. The MICC directed the officers on the ground to let the crowd go to Dufferin Grove Park and to escort them there. At this point the crowd was westbound on Queen Street West approaching York Street.

At 5:17 pm, bike officers accompanying the crowd on Queen Street West at York Street enquired if officers were still investigating individuals at Queen Street West and Noble Street, which is just to the west of Dufferin Street and approximately 3.2 kilometres west of Spadina Avenue. The bike officers were advised that arrests were still being made at Queen and Noble. The bike officers then requested that the officers at Queen and Noble be advised that the crowd from King and Bay planned to attend a location in that area.

At 5:25 pm, the King/Bay crowd was at Queen Street West and Duncan Street and was described as relatively peaceful. CRU bike officers and others were deployed at Spadina Avenue to direct the crowd northbound once they reached that point.

At 5:26 pm, information was received that protesters at Queen Street West and John Street intended to make a run for the security fence. Field commanders at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue advised that the protest was growing in size, requested POU assistance, and began to make preparations in case of the crowd running south towards the fence.

At 5:29 pm, officers at Queen Street West and Noble Street advised they had released a large number of people and had 18 individuals under arrest. They further advised that police resources needed to remain at that location for the time being as the situation was still very dynamic.

At 5:31 pm, the front of the King/Bay crowd was approaching Spadina Avenue.

At 5:34 pm, the King/Bay crowd was described as peaceful and field commanders requested the assistance of CRU bike officers to turn it north at Spadina Avenue.

At 5:35 pm, officers in the field were advised that the MICC was concerned with the presence of Black Bloc members in the crowd and with the possibility of having to contain them if they broke off from the main crowd.

At 5:38 pm, the MICC provided direction to officers in the field to box the crowd at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue.

At 5:46 pm, extraction teams were deployed to Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue.

At 5:47 pm, the MICC directed that the crowd be boxed in on all four sides and that arrests commence.

At 5:50 pm, the MICC advised officers in the field that if the crowd went southbound from Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue it was going straight to the security fence.

At 5:53 pm, the MICC advised that Conspiracy to Commit Mischief would be the charge for the arrests to come.

Starting at 6:01 pm, a number of field commanders contacted the MICC seeking clarification on the direction to box and arrest the protesters at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue. Alternative courses of action including directing the march north on Spadina Avenue, containing the crowd and then designating a dispersal route, or funnelling the crowd through a checkpoint were suggested. Nonetheless, the MICC directed that the intersection would be locked down and all protesters arrested once contained.

At 6:11 pm, an aerial view confirmed the presence of a number of Black Bloc members in the centre of the crowd.

At 6:16 pm, the MICC was advised that arrests had commenced and prisoner transport wagons were requested.

At 6:42 pm, clarification around the use of the LRAD was provided in response to field officers who asked if the LRAD had been used to warn the crowd prior to arrests commencing. The clarification stated that the LRAD is a crowd dispersal tool and its deployment is not required before all arrests.

At 6:43 pm, officers at Queen Street West and Noble Street advised that location was now clear of protesters.

At 6:58 pm, officers advised that a large and unruly crowd of approximately 300 protesters had formed on Queen Street West at Cameron Street, west of Spadina Avenue.

At 7:05 pm, officers advised that Black Bloc members were at the rear of another large group of protesters, this one at Queen Street West and Peter Street, east of Spadina Avenue. A number of arrests of Black Bloc members were soon made at this location.

At 7:21 pm, a number of elderly people in the crowd at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue were released.

At 7:22 pm, officers advised that the crowd at Queen Street West and Cameron Street was down to 50 people.

At 7:26 pm, extremely heavy rain began coming down on the crowd and officers at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue. At this point there were still approximately 300 people to be arrested.

At 7:30 pm, arrangements were made for TTC buses to be used to shelter the arrestees.

At 8:11 pm, the MICC was advised that at least 200 people remained to be arrested.

At 8:36 pm, the MICC was advised that the processing of the arrested individuals was slowing down and more resources were requested.

At 8:38 pm, the Deputy Chief of Police – Specialized Operations Command directed that officers were to stop making arrests immediately and that those already arrested for Breach of the Peace at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue were to be released. The rationale for this was that order had been restored and there was no longer any breach of the peace occurring. While true that there was no breach of the peace at this point, according to the direction given by the MICC at 5:53 pm, the protesters had originally been arrested for Conspiracy to Commit Mischief.

At 9:21 pm, ten TTC buses were en route to Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue to provide a dry location for the release processing of the arrested individuals. Arrestees were also released from the PPC at 629 Eastern Avenue and from several TPS stations.

At 9:38 pm, the Chief ordered that all individuals still under arrest at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue were to be released immediately.

2.7 Summary

In the weeks and days leading up to the G20 Summit, the TPS successfully facilitated numerous peaceful protests attended by thousands of individuals. This was achieved through the use of trained CRU officers to marshal the protests and the work of the CRG Activist/Protester Outreach Team to communicate with protest groups to ensure they were able to peacefully and effectively communicate their messages.

In stark contrast with the tenor of events prior to the Summit weekend, the TPS and its partner agencies were faced with sustained, serious, and widespread criminality and public disorder on Saturday, June 26 and Sunday, June 27, 2010. The scope and intensity of the disorder were without precedent in the history of the TPS. As protesters broke away from the People First march on Saturday afternoon they caused considerable damage to surrounding areas. POU sections lacked the mobility and speed to respond immediately to the affected areas to prevent further disorder. As current POU training predominantly focuses on the use of techniques devised to respond to static crowd formations, consideration should be given to deployment strategies that increase the mobility of public order units and thereby enhance their ability to respond rapidly to highly-dynamic situations.

Crowd behaviour is often influenced by the type and manner of police deployment. Displays of real or implied force can lead to negative crowd reactions that may escalate a situation. Initial

contact by POU officers with protest groups, in the absence of clear indications to the contrary, should be low key and measured. This strategy was employed effectively during peaceful protests where non-POU officers were responsible for managing the movement of organized protests. The dynamic nature of the protest activities that occurred during the G20 Summit required officers not properly trained or equipped to do so to execute POU techniques. Future operations should consider enhanced use of non-POU officers in crowd management situations.

The use of a containment technique or box, referred to by some as a "kettle," has operational merit for containing and preventing the spread of disorder. However, persons not involved in the event must have both a route of egress from and the opportunity to leave the affected area. Containment tactics should be modified to include specific direction as to when they are to be used. When used, a controlled egress point should be established and appropriate notification provided to the crowd.

3. The Incident Management System

Command and control during the operational period of the G20 Summit functioned in accordance with Incident Management System principles⁵ and was delivered at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The Incident Management System (IMS) is a standardized approach to emergency management encompassing personnel, facilities, equipment, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure. The IMS model provides an efficient method for establishing objectives, setting priorities, assigning resources, and taking control of an incident. It also allows for increased efficiencies and interoperability when integrating with other emergency services.

The IMS model provides a number of operational benefits including: common terminology used by all emergency service agencies; modular organization; proper span of control; unified command allowing different agencies to work together effectively; consolidated action plans; unity of command and chain of command.⁶

Given the scope and nature of the G20 Summit, there were a number of partners with different levels of responsibility. The Summit Management Office (SMO) was responsible for all logistical arrangements for the G20 Summit. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was the lead security agency for the G20 Summit and was responsible for overseeing security planning and operations as well as the coordination of operational security requirements with federal, provincial and municipal law enforcement agencies. The RCMP had the lead role in providing protective services to Internationally Protected Persons (IPPs) and maintaining security of identified G20 Summit sites. The RCMP also provided assistance to its policing partners.

The TPS was a full partner in the security for the G20 Summit along with other security and public safety agencies. The TPS was responsible for the safety and security of the public in all areas of Toronto outside of the RCMP protected zones as well as for supporting the RCMP in protecting IPPs.

3.1 The Integrated Security Unit

The central coordinating body for the G20 Summit's security planning, operations and demobilization activities was the RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit (ISU). Key partners within the ISU included TPS, Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Peel Regional Police (PRP) and the Canadian Forces (CF).

Operating under the ISU was a Steering Committee, the Unified Command Centre (UCC), the GTA Area Command Centre (ACC) and the Major Incident Command Centre (MICC). Command and control was delivered through these interconnected centers at strategic, operational and tactical levels (Appendix C).

⁵ Incident Management System for Ontario, December 2008.

⁶ Ibid.

Steering Committee

The Steering Committee was comprised of senior officers from the RCMP, OPP, TPS, PRP and the CF. The Steering Committee was to be briefed on developments and assess and direct all strategic decisions regarding the security of the G20 Summit which were outside the parameters of authority of the UCC. In making these decisions they were to support, manage and assess the impact of strategic decisions between police agencies, departments, services, and the CF. They were to ensure that prescribed strategic decisions were consistent with the individual mandate/role of all partners.

Unified Command Centre

The UCC was comprised of Commanders from all participating agencies, departments, services, and forces. The UCC was the highest level of command and control for the G20 Summit and the operational decision making authority in the Unified Command structure.

Unified Command provides all agencies, departments, services, and forces with geographic or functional jurisdiction for an incident and the opportunity to manage the incident by establishing a common set of objectives and strategies.

Area Command Centre

The ACC served as a link to the UCC. All IPP movements and requests for specialized resources or support had to flow through the ACC.

Major Incident Command Centre

The MICC was the central point of command, control, communication and information for the TPS. The MICC Incident Commander had a full perspective of all resources under the command of the TPS and tactical control of those resources in his function of ensuring the safety and security of the public in all areas of Toronto outside of the RCMP protected zones. The MICC also had the best overall perspective of G20 Summit-related events/activities in order to strategically direct resources on the ground. Field commanders operated under the MICC and were in charge of both fixed sites and mobile sections of officers. They were responsible for providing tactical leadership for the resources and security assignments given to them.

Additionally, the MICC was responsible for the continuity of policing services throughout the City of Toronto and for liaising with the City's Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), which provided the TPS with a link to all critical city partners. The MICC maintained continuous communications with the EOC and shared operational awareness with the ACC and the UCC.

4. Planning

The G8/G20 Planning Team (Planning Team) was originally formed in 2009 to create security and traffic plans for the International Media Centre that was to be located in Toronto during the G8 Summit. The Planning Team was expanded when it was announced that the G20 Summit would be held in Toronto. Sub-sections of the Planning Team that will be discussed in this section are: Finance & Administration (F&A); Logistics and Communications.

External consultants were hired on a contract basis to provide logistical expertise to the TPS that otherwise would not have been available. The expertise of outside organizations, such as the City of Toronto, provided valuable support and assistance.

The relatively short planning time did not allow for full integration of the Planning Team with those responsible for managing police operations during the event. For example, the Incident Commanders were responsible for developing the MICC at TPS Headquarters while also still performing their regular duties, including managing their home units. This meant the Incident Commanders did not have time to participate in the planning process and were put in the position of executing plans they did not develop. Field commanders were also not fully involved in the planning process. As a result, they were not familiar with many of the issues and challenges that arose during the planning process and had no input into how the plan would be made operational. This meant that when operational, these field commanders were not completely familiar with the scope of the plan. These issues were compounded by the fact that various operational plans were not completed until the day before deployment, making it difficult for those responsible for enacting the plan to read and absorb the contents.

4.1 Finance & Administration

The F&A Team was established to: monitor sources of funds; perform requirements analysis and costing; develop, co-ordinate and submit a budget to Public Safety Canada; track and report costs versus budget; track Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) and monitor associated costs; negotiate contracts; procure equipment and supplies and issue reimbursements.

Memoranda of Agreement

To address the involvement of 26 different police services in the G20 Summit, more than 30 different MOA were required. These MOA ensured fair, consistent, and mutually agreed upon working and compensation arrangements, and ensured compliance with the terms of the Public Safety Canada funding agreement.

Funding

Funding for incremental security and policing-related costs of the G20 Summit was available through the Federal Government's Security Cost Framework Policy. Major security partners were required to submit their funding requirements to Public Safety Canada. If approved, funds would be made available through a contract between the respective security partner and the Minister of Public Safety.

Budget Development

To assist with the development of the budget, F&A members met with over 28 specialized TPS units, as well as partner city emergency services. In doing so, salary and non-salary

requirements were defined and an estimate of the expected costs was developed, greatly assisting in the development of a realistic budget.

Upon approval by Public Safety Canada, the gross budget totalled \$155.3 million (net \$144.4 million budget). This budget would cover security costs for the TPS, Toronto Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Toronto Fire Services (TFS), other City agencies, boards, commissions and departments, as well as outside services providing assistance to the TPS for the event.

Procurement

The F&A Team, with the involvement of the Logistics Team, was responsible for the procurement of equipment and supplies for the G20 Summit operation: approximately \$39.3 million worth of budgeted equipment, supplies and services needed to be procured in a four to six month period. The actual (unaudited) cost was \$29.6 million excluding purchases for the MICC. To ensure fairness in contracting, that value for money was obtained, and that grant criteria were met for purchases, specific purchasing procedures were created for the G20 Summit to supplement existing TPS purchasing procedures.

4.2 Logistics, Staging and Prisoner Processing Facility

Based on the experience of previous economic summits, it was believed that various interested groups and individuals would come to protest at the G20 Summit. While most protest activity had been peaceful at previous summits, there was an acknowledged potential for violent protests. While at the time of planning the size and makeup of protest groups were unknown, the TPS prepared for all potentialities, including the possibility of large-scale public disorder.

From an operational perspective it was recognized that the ability to detain and process a large number of people efficiently would be crucial to ensuring resources remained available in the field.

Existing police facilities in the City of Toronto were reviewed and found to be insufficient to handle a large influx of arrested persons. It was therefore recommended by the Planning Team that a Prisoner Processing Centre (PPC) be established.

In late January 2010, a facility for lease was located at 629 Eastern Avenue. The property was comprised of several large buildings, totalling approximately 240,000 square feet in size.

The facility was leased by the TPS and possession of the property was taken on April 1st, 2010. Construction began immediately to bring the facility up to the standards that were required to operate it as the Logistics Operations Centre (LogOps), Main Staging and PPC.

A concern with this property was that it was located more than 38 kilometres away from the designated court location at 2201 Finch Avenue West. However, it was just over 5 kilometres away from the G20 Summit site at the MTCC. The distance from the G20 Summit site was believed to be close enough to enable quick transportation and off-loading of prisoners, but far enough away that it would not be a direct target for protesters.

As the facility consisted of several large buildings, it was believed to be suitable for locating the PPC, the Main Staging area and LogOps. In addition, with the PPC, Main Staging and LogOps

located at one site, the TPS could limit security requirements, making additional officers available for deployment.

4.3 Logistics

The Logistics Team was responsible for all the transportation, feeding, supplies, and equipment needs, as well as accommodations and facilities, for the police response to the G20 Summit. In addition, the Logistics Team was responsible for establishing and dismantling all facilities and ensuring that all locations received the necessary resources to function on a 24/7 basis.

The Transportation Section of LogOps was responsible for the overall transportation plan that involved moving police personnel between sites, hotels, and parking areas. The Transportation Section was also responsible for the control and distribution of all the police and rental vehicles that were used, as well as the fuel plan for these vehicles. Vehicles used during the G20 Summit consisted of Service, rental, and borrowed vehicles. Buses, supplied by the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), and rental vans dispatched from 629 Eastern Avenue were used to move personnel to and from various locations.

The Feeding Section of LogOps was responsible for the acquisition, contracting, and distribution of all meals, as well as the management of the 13 relief centres that were operational on a 24/7 basis. The Supply Section of LogOps was responsible for the acquisition and distribution of all supplies and equipment purchased, rented/leased, borrowed, and TPS-owned. The Accommodations & Facilities Section of LogOps was responsible for the acquisition of all accommodations and facilities required to support all TPS operational and administrative sites. This Section was also responsible for the allocation of hotel rooms to those who required accommodation.

In addition, the Logistics Team was responsible for establishing and dismantling all facilities and ensuring that all locations received the necessary resources to function on a 24/7 basis.

4.4 Communications

The role of Communications Services was to provide G20 Summit personnel with a public safety grade portable radio system that would allow our members, other police services, and partner agencies to communicate within their user groups and sectors, and with the Communications Centre. Carrying out this responsibility involved several components.

Important in the establishment of a radio system was the creation of talk groups based on the IMS model and the geographical location of the specific detail. It was intended that only commanders or supervisors would transmit on the radio, rather than the large number of frontline officers. This would keep the number of officers speaking on any given channel relatively low, while the front line officers could simply monitor the radio channel. During operations, however, officers were moved from one area to another in response to changes in the tactical environment. The total number of officers on a given channel increased as officers changed from one radio channel to another, corresponding with their redeployment. Further, in the midst of the rapidly changing and challenging tactical environment, individual officers, rather than just commanders or supervisors, began transmitting on the radio. While the system continued to function, the number of officers attempting to transmit meant the system was no longer optimally effective. There were simply too many people trying to talk at once.

5. Training

There were many types of training required for the G20 Summit to address the diverse requirements of groups such as Primary Response Units (PRU), Public Order Units (POU), external police services (both from Ontario and from other provinces), and specialized units. Training for all of these groups had to be developed and delivered in a very short period of time.

5.1 Primary Response Training

It was understood that PRU officers would be staffing barricades, conducting access control checks, and performing duties requiring awareness in crowd management, among other assignments. Officers also needed to be comfortable wearing helmets and gas masks in crowd control situations. Members of the Toronto Police College developed a training plan that utilized both on-line and face-to-face delivery strategies. The training developed by the College was broken down into two on-line modules as well as a subsequent one day practical face-to-face training session. Participation in training expanded to include non-PRU TPS officers and civilian TPS members. Over 6000 TPS members and over 2000 members of outside agencies completed the on-line training modules. More than 3000 TPS members completed the face-to-face training module. Members were required to complete the portions of training that corresponded to their role in the upcoming G20 Summit.

5.2 Public Order Unit Training

The various POU officers policing the G20 Summit had training requirements beyond the curriculum detailed above. The TPS Public Safety & Emergency Management Unit (PS&EM) ensured that all POU officers from external police services had adequate training at their own services prior to being deployed. The PS&EM also designed and implemented a POU-specific training program to meet the additional requirements. External and internal POU officers also completed the on-line training components previously described. An additional 400 Community Response Unit (CRU) officers participated in one day of POU block training. HOT Teams (Prisoner Hand Off Teams) participated in dynamic situation training and additional HOT Teams were created, resulting in a total of four. An Obstacle Removal Team was created and trained. In all, 1600 members from the TPS and other services received POU training.

5.3 Emergency Task Force Training

The Emergency Task Force (ETF) also participated in G20 Summit-specific training. Approximately 15 Explosives Disposal Unit (EDU) technicians took part in a two day TPS Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear refresher course; TPS EDU and the OPP Provincial Emergency Response Team took part in four days of training on Large Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices and Water Craft Improvised Explosive Devices; and the ETF and the Marine Unit participated in five days of Water Borne Vessel assault training as well as ferry familiarization and boarding. In addition, members also continued with weekly ETF team training focused on hostage rescue, high risk vehicle stops, and EDU building searches.

5.4 Incident Management System Training

To assist with proper incident command protocols, TPS personnel and MICC staff received IMS training. The level of IMS training that was delivered depended on the member's role during the G20 Summit. Despite this training, it was noted that some members did not have a clear understanding of IMS roles and responsibilities and had difficulty applying the IMS model during operations. TPS members should receive additional training in IMS protocol that includes practical exercises for future operations.

6. Intelligence

The intelligence function for the G8/G20 Summits was conducted through the ISU Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). The JIG was a stand alone, integrated intelligence unit responsible for all intelligence related matters for the G8/G20 Summits. The mandate of the JIG was to collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate accurate information and intelligence in a timely manner to facilitate the decision making process in both the planning and execution phases of securing the G8/G20 Summits. The JIG fulfilled this mandate by ensuring that criminal activity and other related threats to the G8/G20 Summits were identified and that the risks were fully appreciated by those who had a need to know, in order that appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate risks to the G8/G20 Summits were taken.

The JIG was led by the RCMP and operated as a Joint Forces Operation that had TPS, CF, PRP, OPP and other security and law enforcement partners. The JIG worked in conjunction with the Planning, Operations and Operational Support units of the G8/G20 Summits ISU.

The ISU JIG successfully contributed to the federal mandate of ensuring the security of the G8/G20 Summits. However, the TPS' broader responsibilities under the *Police Services Act* of preserving the peace, preventing crimes and other offences, and apprehending criminals and other offenders who may lawfully be taken into custody was not as great a priority for the ISU and proved to be a greater challenge. Clear expectations of the JIG's commitment to the G20 Summit, and to the police agency of jurisdiction were not fully understood and in future must be more precisely spelled out.

Secondments for some of the TPS G8/G20 Summits intelligence functions occurred in the final weeks leading up to the G8/G20 Summits. Due to the time constraints, event-specific training required for the selected officers was not provided to the level it might have been.

The JIG created a single source for intelligence. It allowed for a single, consistent and reliable approach to the development and dissemination of intelligence, strategic and tactical, on any potential threats specific to the G8/G20 Summits. It was very effective in the planning stages, and up to the actual G8/G20 Summits. However, in the dynamic public order events on June 26 and June 27 there were delays in the timely delivery of important tactical intelligence to the end users in the MICC.

The JIG obliged all partners to work in a federally regulated, classified environment. This classified environment often created systemic challenges in the timely, effective handling and dissemination of a variety of classified intelligence documents / products. The result was less timely or effective interventions by front line or responding police officers.

In the months and weeks leading up to the G8/G20 Summits, intelligence briefings on the identified security threats were provided to the planning and operations groups. In the actual days of the G20 Summit, the intelligence briefings were provided regularly at the commander level but did not occur at the frontline level.

7. Security at the Fence

After the federal government announced that the G20 Summit would be held in Toronto, the TPS began intensive preparations which included meetings with the RCMP and ISU in preparation for the provision of security and policing services during the G20 Summit.

Under the *Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act* (FMIOA), the RCMP had primary responsibility for providing the security necessary for the proper functioning of the G20 Summit. As such, the RCMP took a lead role in the planning of security for the G8/G20 Summits, particularly around the MTCC and the hotels where the various dignitaries were staying. As discussed, zones with varying levels of security were designated by the RCMP. The boundaries for these zones were determined by the ISU and the RCMP.

7.1 The Public Works Protection Act

The TPS G8/G20 Planning Team (Planning Team) sought legal guidance on a number of issues while preparing for the G20 Summit. One significant issue was the legal authority for the TPS to demand and collect information for the accreditation system required by the ISU for pre-approved entry to the IZ. A related issue was the power to conduct searches and demand identification from persons who sought to enter the IZ on an ad hoc basis.

Counsel representing the ISU members identified a number of different legal authorities that might be relied on by the TPS to support the existing common law and statutory powers of police officers in policing the perimeter of the IZ.

One suggestion was that the TPS rely on the *Public Works Protection Act* (PWPA), a statute which has been in force for over 70 years and which provides general authority for police and others to protect "public works." The definition of "public work" in section 1 of the PWPA is very broad and includes "any railway, canal, highway, bridge, power works," and any provincial and any municipal public building." The PWPA has been utilized for years as the basis for conducting searches of people entering courthouses in Ontario. The PWPA also allows for any other building, place or work to be designated a "public work" through the enactment of a regulation.

On the advice of ISU counsel, the TPS requested that the provincial government enact such a regulation in order to give the police additional powers to protect the security fence and the people and activities within it. The Regulation was subsequently reported on "E- Laws" but was not communicated to the public.

Initially, police were of the understanding that the Regulation gave them the power to search any person within five metres outside of the security fence. When this incorrect interpretation of the Regulation became public, it generated significant media attention. On Friday, June 25, 2010, ISU lawyers advised the TPS that the Regulation covered certain areas within the fence rather than outside the fence. The TPS took immediate steps to communicate the correct information to all officers. Again, the correct information was not communicated to the public.

There were two people arrested under the authority of the PWPA – one under the general powers of the Act and one under the authority of the Regulation

7.2 Breach of the Peace

One of the duties of a police officer at common law and under the *Police Services Act* is to preserve the peace. The common law and the *Criminal Code*⁷ provide a police officer with the power to arrest an individual for a breach of the peace. The power to arrest an individual for a breach of the peace provides the means for police officers to carry out their duty to preserve the peace. It also serves as a mechanism to intervene in conduct which is escalating and which could result in injuries to persons and the destruction of property.

While police officers can arrest individuals for a breach of the peace under the *Criminal Code*, there is no related offence of breach of the peace with which a person can be charged. This caused confusion to members of the public who were lawfully arrested for breach of the peace but not charged with an offence under the *Criminal Code*.

7.3 Long Range Acoustic Device

The TPS purchased four Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) after extensive research and a review of past summits. Careful consideration was also given to recommendations arising out of inquiries into the APEC Conference in Vancouver and Ipperwash in Ontario which stressed the importance of police services effectively communicating with crowds during demonstrations.

The LRAD is a directed hailing and warning acoustic device whose design greatly assists authorities in communicating with members of the public. The TPS planned to use the LRAD to assist officers with the communication of messages to large crowds. Procedures were drafted to provide clear guidelines for the use of the LRAD to ensure that the device was not used as a weapon and that the health and safety of the public and the officers using the LRAD were protected.

Prior to the commencement of the G20 Summit, legal proceedings were initiated seeking to prohibit the TPS and the OPP from using LRADs. On June 25, 2010, the Court completely dismissed the injunction against the OPP and sought some small adjustments to the operating guidelines with respect to volume and distance settings for the TPS.

In its analysis, the Court stated as follows:

The recommendations made by the APEC and Ipperwash inquiries, set out earlier in these reasons, emphasize in spades the need for clear, timely and effective police communication with demonstrators in order to avoid unnecessary conflict between the police and protesters and to preserve the peace...The need for enhanced communications by the police with demonstrators in order to preserve the peace operates as a strong public interest factor supporting the use by the respondents of their LRADs as communication tools.⁸

⁷ Section 31 of the Criminal Code of Canada

⁸ Paragraphs 129 and 130, *Corporation of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association et al. v. Toronto Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police*, June 25, 2010, Ontario Superior Court of Justice

During the G20 Summit the LRAD was utilized on two occasions. The first time was on June 26, 2010 on the south lawn of Queen's Park when protesters gathered after the violence and destruction of property on Yonge Street and elsewhere. The LRAD was used again later the same day near Queen Street West and Soho Street after several police vehicles were burned.

In both instances, pre-recorded messages giving specific directions were communicated to the crowd in English and French. The use of the LRAD was effective and provided police with the ability to quickly identify persons in the crowd who were willing to comply with police direction. The use of the LRAD also gave many in the crowd the opportunity to leave a particular area and disassociate themselves from violent behaviour.

8. Prisoner Management

The PPC was responsible for receiving, investigating, and processing persons arrested for offences related to the G20 Summit. The PPC was also responsible for co-ordinating prisoner release and transportation of those not released to a designated court facility. The facility became operational on June 18 and remained operational until June 29, when the last prisoners were transferred to court.

8.1 PPC Facility

The PPC facility at 629 Eastern Avenue was designed to hold 500 people at any given time, but was capable of holding up to 750 people, if required. This number was considered to be both reasonable and prudent in light of the experience of past summits. If the PPC had to be evacuated or closed, or in the event that more than 500 arrests occurred over a short period of time, existing police stations would be used as necessary.

The facility also incorporated offices for the TFS, EMS, and a separate medical trailer staffed by an on-site physician. Having a physician readily available to assess and provide medical care was extremely beneficial. The physician was able to triage patients and assess the need for an elevated level of medical care, as well as administer stitches and prescribe clearly labelled medication. This resulted in a reduction of prisoner escorts to hospitals.

There were 51 bullpens spread throughout the facility. There were 15 located in the pre-booking area, 30 were in the main holding area, and another 6 were in the release/hold for court area. Each of these bullpens was 10'x 20' in size and was equipped with a port-o-potty. The bullpens were all similar in size to a standard bullpen located in a police or court facility. In addition to the bullpens, 25 individual cells were constructed for persons who might require segregation from the general population due to violence or mental health concerns.

The facility was equipped with over 100 video cameras that monitored and recorded the movements of prisoners in custody at the facility. Court Services personnel provided constant monitoring of all the cameras so that issues arising in a cell could be quickly addressed. The video cameras were suspended above the cells in a way that captured the entire bullpen; this positioning meant, however, that individual prisoners within the bullpen were difficult to identify, making tracking difficult.

8.2 PPC Planning

The Planning Team was responsible for the overall planning, design, and concept of operation for the PPC. Planners from Court Services were consulted for their experience and tasked with duties such as staffing, prisoner transportation, and training.

As Court Services would be responsible for the operation of the facility, a planning sub-committee was created in that unit. This planning sub-committee had their own concept of operations which conflicted with some aspects of the operation, roles, and responsibilities set in place by the Planning Team. Ultimately, the differing visions of two planning teams for one facility led to a breakdown in communications during operations. This had a significant impact on how the facility functioned.

The facility was designed to operate much like a divisional police facility, except on a much larger scale. One of the main differences between this facility and a divisional facility was that the PPC was going to be operated in large part by court officers. Court officers appeared to be the logical choice as they have extensive training and experience in the transportation and management of prisoners on a large scale. Although court officers were used for a majority of the operations, there were still positions in the PPC that required staffing by police officers.

As the PPC was designed to operate like a divisional facility, it was envisioned that standard procedures and processes used in everyday operations would apply. This provided some challenges, as there are differences in the standard procedures and processes used by court officers and by police officers. These small differences in procedures and process were problematic and partially responsible for lengthy delays experienced by many who were detained at the PPC.

The Planning Team had drafted roles and responsibilities for many of the court and police officers who were assigned to specific functions in the PPC. Just prior to becoming operational, several positions and functions were changed by Court Services though the roles and responsibilities were not changed.

Court Services divided the facility into four zones with a court supervisor responsible for each zone. How the facility was to operate was explained to all Court Services personnel during briefings, though it was left to the discretion of the supervisors to determine how their respective zone operated. This was problematic as some processes which were developed on one shift were changed by the relieving shift. While changes may have been made with good intentions to expedite or improve processes, some changes caused duplication and miscommunication between the two shifts resulting in prisoner management challenges.

Dividing the facility into four zones set clear boundaries of responsibility for each supervisor and court officers working within each zone. While this resulted in supervisors clearly understanding their area of responsibility, it left very few people with overall situational awareness of the facility. Minor issues experienced and addressed in each respective zone collectively resulted in more serious issues that directly affected operations.

8.3 Prisoner Transportation

On Saturday, June 26 and Sunday, June 27, the TPS used 21 prisoner transport vehicles per shift, providing a total capacity of 425 prisoners. As police officers were required for frontline duties, court officers were used to operate the prisoner transport vehicles. The use of court officers in prisoner transport vehicles during such a dynamic and violent event proved challenging in some instances.

Court officers do not carry the same use of force options as police officers and are not used for frontline policing. On Saturday, June 26, prisoner transport vehicles were prevented from attending arrest locations due to ongoing violent protest activities, but police officers continued making arrests requiring prisoner transportation. TPS' prisoner transport vehicles are not equipped with the emergency equipment required by the *Highway Traffic Act* and therefore are not designated as emergency vehicles. In addition, the *Highway Traffic Act* only gives exemptions to police officers to disobey certain *Highway Traffic Act* offences under specific conditions. At times during the G20 Summit weekend the use of police officers in some prisoner transport vehicles would have been beneficial and may have allowed a quicker response.

8.4 Arrests

Of the 1118 people arrested during the G20 Summit, 885 were transported to and processed at the PPC, including 81 people who were arrested at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue on Sunday, June 27 and who were released from the facility shortly after their arrival. On Sunday evening it was determined that the PPC could no longer accept additional prisoners, so 71 people were transported from Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue to 43 and 23 Divisions. These prisoners were also released shortly after their arrival at these locations. The remainder of the people arrested were not transported to the PPC but were detained and released unconditionally in the field. The majority of these were people detained at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue on Sunday, June 27, 2010.

As discussed previously, it was impractical for police officers to transport prisoners to the PPC, as this would have resulted in the loss of personnel from the frontlines for several hours. Given that arresting officers were not able to transport prisoner themselves, it was important to be able to accurately record the details of the arrest.

An arrest HOT sheet, similar to a standard record of arrest was developed to incorporate very specific details about the arrest that were required for the transportation, booking, and investigation of any prisoner. The HOT sheet consisted of an original and two copies. The original stayed with the arresting officer, and the remaining two copies were used at the PPC for booking and investigation.

A roving "triage" team of uniformed constables was used to attend arrest locations and assist with the hand-over between the arresting officers and the transporting court officers. The triage team's responsibility was that of quality control – to ensure that all paperwork and accompanying property was completed and accurate. With the dynamic situations that were occurring on the weekend of the G20 Summit, there were not enough triage officers available to respond to the different arrest locations. In addition, many triage officers had difficulty getting to arrest locations due to traffic congestion and ongoing protests. In many instances, a direct hand-off occurred between the arresting officer and the court officer. As triage officers were not always present to ensure quality control, some HOT sheets and prisoner's property forms were not completed thoroughly, which resulted in delays when the prisoner arrived at the PPC.

The HOT sheets were suitable for the arrests of smaller numbers of people, when officers had sufficient time to complete them. However, for the mass arrests of people that took place, the HOT sheets proved to be unsuitable since the detailed information required on the sheets delayed the loading of the prisoner transport vehicles. In addition, the very heavy rainfall that was experienced on the Sunday evening made writing on the HOT sheets difficult, if not impossible.

All prisoners were issued an arm band with a control number. In order to maintain continuity of property and video evidence related to the prisoner, this control number was associated with all items. When prisoners were paraded before a staff sergeant, the control number corresponded with a Criminal Information Processing System number, allowing for easy tracking by investigators. While it was thought that prisoners might remove the armband, resulting in identification challenges, very few prisoners actually did so.

When arrested, two digital photographs were to be taken of the prisoner with the arresting officer. One photograph stayed with the HOT sheet and the second photo was given to the

arresting officer. This was done so that booking and investigating officers at the PPC would have a photograph of the prisoner with the arresting officer should tracking or identifying later become an issue. In many instances, photographs were not taken at the scene due to technical difficulties with equipment. Subsequently, delays were experienced and many prisoners who had not been photographed at the arrest scene were photographed when they arrived at the PPC.

The majority of prisoners arrested were handcuffed in flex-cuffs by arresting officers. It was intended that the flex-cuffs would be removed by court officers and steel handcuffs placed on prisoners with their hands to the front for transportation to the PPC. This did not always occur due to a shortage of steel cuffs. Further, the changing of handcuffs slowed the loading process. The result was that some prisoners remained in flex-cuffs, some of those with their hands behind their back during transportation to the PPC. However, when prisoner transport vehicles arrived at the PPC, prisoners were placed in flex-cuffs to the front until they were paraded before a staff sergeant at which time the cuffs were removed.

8.5 Booking/Detention

Bottlenecks during the booking of prisoners into a police facility can occur whenever large numbers of arrests are made. Current TPS divisions only have the capacity to book or parade one person at a time. During the booking process, the Officer in Charge (usually a staff sergeant) must assess the physical and mental state of all prisoners. Each prisoner's property must be properly documented and the appropriate search must be completed, a process which can take from ten to thirty minutes. Any bottleneck creates a ripple effect, with arrested persons having to wait in the secure detention space available.

In an attempt to minimize bottlenecking as much as possible, the Planning Team arranged for 12 booking trailers to be constructed to facilitate the intake of prisoners into the PPC. However, Court Services inserted an additional procedural layer prior to the prisoners entering a booking trailer. It was envisioned that prisoners would be unloaded from the prisoner transport vehicle and observed by a court intake officer who would address any immediate medical concerns; the prisoner would then immediately be taken before a staff sergeant in compliance with standard TPS operating procedures. Temporary pre-booking cells were constructed and placed next to the booking trailers where prisoners were to be placed if all booking trailers were occupied. Prisoners held in these pre-booking cells were to be kept in restraints as they had not yet been seen by a staff sergeant to determine if their continued detention was lawful and if a more thorough search of their person was required.

The Criminal Information Processing System (CIPS) is a program used by the TPS to manage, track, and record all information pertaining to a prisoner's arrest and detention in a police facility. The Planning Team envisioned that CIPS would be utilized to track prisoners in the PPC but it was the belief of Court Services that a booking and tracking system similar to one used in court facilities on a daily basis was required. As a result, a spreadsheet was created to contain information relevant to Court Services. The intent of this spreadsheet was to capture the time that prisoners entered the facility, to track their movements, and to ensure all prisoners were being investigated and released in a timely manner. Much of the information contained in this Court Services spreadsheet was a duplication of information which would have been contained in CIPS after a prisoner was paraded. Prisoners were required to provide their information to a court officer populating this spreadsheet prior to being seen by the booking staff sergeant.

There were approximately 450 persons arrested on Saturday evening into Sunday morning. This massive influx of prisoners, all within a matter of hours, overwhelmed the single Court Services pre-booking officer. The information being recorded on the spreadsheet took approximately one minute per prisoner to enter, in addition to the time spent organizing the HOT sheets and photographs. Additional copies of a prisoner's HOT sheet were required to assist in the tracking of the prisoner throughout the facility. The photocopying of this paperwork added to the time required by Court Services to record a prisoner's information. The information being collected was too much for one person to gather efficiently. As it took a significant amount of time to gather and record the information, a bottleneck occurred at this position. Arrests continued through Sunday and the Court Services pre-booking officer was unable to relieve the bottleneck until the arrests slowed Sunday evening. The bottleneck had a direct impact on the timely release of prisoners. A second pre-booking officer was added by Court Services on Sunday evening in an attempt to relieve the backlog of paperwork that still needed to be entered.

In order to accurately record the time that a prisoner entered the facility, members unloading the prisoner transport vehicles were instructed to write the time that a prisoner entered the facility on the top of the HOT sheet. Due to the volume of arrests, this did not occur in many instances. This meant that the Court Services pre-booking officer did not know the time that a prisoner actually entered the facility. As it was several hours after a prisoner had entered the facility that their HOT sheet was actually entered into the pre-booking spreadsheet, the time recorded did not accurately reflect the actual time the prisoner entered the facility. This resulted in further difficulties as it related to the prioritization of the release of prisoners.

Prisoners remained handcuffed and were not paraded before the Officer in Charge (OIC) until their information was recorded on the Court Services pre-booking spreadsheet, and their paperwork and their property was in order. Initially, prisoners were placed in the pre-booking cells until their information was recorded on the spreadsheet. Due to the massive influx of prisoners, the pre-booking cells quickly filled to beyond the planned capacity and as many as 30 people were lodged in one bullpen at a time. Additional prisoners were temporarily placed in the main holding area within the facility. Several of the individuals placed in this area faced delays up to 24 hours.

Due to the delays, the OIC was not given the opportunity to assess prisoners' physical and mental states and inquire as to any suicidal behaviour before they were placed in cells with other prisoners. In addition, unless a pre-existing medical condition was recorded on the HOT sheet by the arresting officers or was indicated to a court officer at the PPC, there was no formal procedure to identify this until being interviewed by the OIC. The fact that some prisoners faced delays in seeing the OIC, and many others were released from the facility without ever seeing the OIC, is contrary to TPS Procedures.

There was no plan to house people arrested for Breach of the Peace in separate cells from those arrested for criminal offences. This lack of segregation was challenging when decisions were eventually made for the mass release of prisoners who had been arrested for Breach of the Peace. The release process was slowed as paperwork had to be reviewed by investigators to ensure that only those arrested for Breach of the Peace were released unconditionally.

Attempts were made to ensure that prisoners were given reasonable use of the telephone and the opportunity to speak to legal counsel. This, however, did not occur until the prisoner had been seen by the OIC and placed in the main holding area. Due to the bottleneck, access to telephones for many did not occur for several hours. Most prisoners who were held and

released from custody before seeing the OIC did not have the opportunity to use the telephone. Prisoners who were in the main holding area and who asked to make a telephone call were allowed to do so, in order of each request. Court officers accompanied prisoners to 1 of 12 telephone booths. In addition, up to four duty counsel lawyers were on-site at the PPC between 10:00 am and 10:00 pm to speak to prisoners. Some prisoners spent long periods of time speaking to counsel on the telephone which, due to the volume of requests, delayed the use of the telephones by other prisoners. The availability of duty counsel on-site during such an operation was convenient and allowed prisoners to speak with counsel in person. The ability to have lawyers present on a 24-hour basis should be considered for similar types of operations in the future.

Female, male, and youth prisoners were all placed in separate bullpens. Due to the fact that many of the pre-holding cells were filled beyond capacity, there were a few instances where youths were accidentally placed in cells with adults. As soon as these errors were identified, the youths were removed and placed in the appropriate holding area.

CIPS is used in Toronto police facilities to monitor and track prisoner movement while in custody. Only a limited number of Court Services personnel use this system. In normal operations, the feeding, telephone use, and movement of prisoners in court facilities are not tracked as thoroughly by court officers as prisoners are in a police division. It was envisioned by the Planning Team that as the PPC was to be operated much like a divisional police facility, that CIPS would be used. It was not, however, used for the tracking of prisoners by Court Services personnel.

Court Services designed a hard copy prisoner tracking form that contained all information required by CIPS that was intended to follow prisoners through the facility. This form was designed to be filled out by court officers when prisoners were moved, fed, or used the telephone. The problem was that the information recorded on the form was not entered into CIPS until the prisoner was released from the facility. Therefore, if members required a 'real time' update, they had to locate the prisoner and then check the individual tracking form. In addition, the tracking forms were not completed for some prisoners who were lodged temporarily in cells waiting to be seen by the OIC. As some of these prisoners experienced lengthy delays, many were moved and fed without the information being documented on these forms.

Prisoners were given food and water at all stages of their detention. At first, feeding was tracked on the prisoner tracking form. During the weekend, the large volume of prisoners along with the difficulties experienced with the tracking forms made it difficult to record each prisoner's feeding. Court officers regularly fed and gave water to prisoners en masse.

Since CIPS was not used by court officers in the PPC, there was no central tracking system that provided real time information on the location of a prisoner. Prisoners were tracked in their respective zones, but once the prisoner moved into a new zone, tracking stopped in the previous zone and started in the new one. The lack of a central tracking system was problematic, especially when prisoners were moved between zones.

8.6 Prisoner Property

Challenges were experienced in itemizing and categorizing prisoners' property. To ensure continuity, a prisoner's personal property and any items deemed to be evidence were itemized

and sealed in a tamper proof evidence bag by the arresting officer in the field. Personal property was turned over to court officers and accompanied the prisoner to the PPC. Items that might be used as evidence in criminal proceedings were turned over to PEMU staff who assisted in completing the appropriate paperwork.

The separation of personal effects and evidentiary items is standard practice for police. During the normal course of events, an accused is paraded before a staff sergeant, their property is inventoried on camera, and a CIPS case is created. Investigators then determine what is required for evidence as opposed to what are the prisoner's personal effects. The property is then processed accordingly and evidence documented. This process did not occur during the G20 Summit. This meant the arresting officer in the field, not an investigator, would determine the difference between evidence and personal effects. Due to the quantity of personal property brought to the PPC, investigators could not be expected to examine each piece of property to determine what was of evidentiary value. This resulted in countless items of potential evidence being given back to prisoners upon their release.

An undetermined number of property bags containing prisoners' personal property were not itemized thoroughly by the arresting officers at the scene and some bags that were completed contained only limited information. This meant that court officers spent a great deal of time itemizing and attempting to link property to its rightful owner.

Property storage proved to be insufficient to handle the volume so, as a result, several different areas in the facility were used to store property. Processes to deal with property also changed between shifts. This resulted in delays when prisoners were released or taken to court, as a substantial amount of time was spent searching for property. In addition, several prisoners were released without their property as it could not be located in a timely manner. Most of this property has since been returned to its owners.

8.7 Release

It was intended that when a prisoner was to be released, they would be brought before a staff sergeant at one of the booking trailers. During operations, however, this was found to be impracticable as it required additional prisoner movement, and as a result, an identification trailer was re-designated a release trailer. This proved to be adequate until the mass influx of prisoners at the PPC and the subsequent mass releases that occurred on Sunday. The staff sergeant assigned to the release trailer could not manage the volume of prisoners being released. Many prisoners ended up being released from the holding area instead of individually before a staff sergeant, which is the appropriate process.

With the bottleneck and delay that was experienced, decisions were made on Sunday by Court Services to begin releasing prisoners before they had been booked into the facility or investigated by one of the investigative teams. The quick release of so many prisoners was essential to ensure that they were not detained any longer than necessary. However, this proved to be problematic from a records management perspective. Difficulties were experienced after the G20 Summit identifying and updating relevant arrest and release documents.

Protests that occurred in front of the PPC on Sunday delayed the release of some prisoners as the facility was placed in "hold and secure" several times throughout the day. Prisoners were not released during these times until it was determined safe enough to do so without compromising the facility or impacting the police operations that were occurring.

On Sunday morning, June 27, 113 people were arrested at the University of Toronto and transported to the PPC for investigation. Some of these prisoners faced delays up to 36 hours before being taken before a Justice of the Peace. On two separate occasions on Monday June 28, the Livescan terminals that were meant to fingerprint and photograph prisoners went out of service due to technical difficulties. Although the terminals were repaired, there was a delay that impacted the transportation of some prisoners to court. The use of video remand was authorized by the courts on the evening of June 28 and a number of prisoners were remanded into custody at that time.

The booking and release of every prisoner was supposed to be done on a separate video. This video was to accompany the prisoner through the investigation and release process and was intended to accompany the prisoner's paperwork to court for their first appearance. The standard practice for the TPS is that most booking and release videos are only provided after a disclosure request is received. With the volume of arrests expected, the intent of this process was to front-end load the work rather than wait until receiving a disclosure request. However, this process was slow and resulted in delays preparing prisoners for court.

While the procedures employed at the PPC created delays in prisoner processing and made tracking the movement of prisoners difficult, it should be noted that the personnel running the PPC took seriously their responsibility to ensure the safety of prisoners. Prisoners were given food and water en masse when difficulties with the prisoner tracking forms made it difficult to determine individual prisoners' feeding times. Also, Court Services personnel assessed prisoners waiting in the pre-booking cells for injuries and those that could not be treated by the on-site physician were transported to hospital as soon as possible. Of all those arrested during the G20 Summit, only five suffered injuries that required they go to hospital.

9. Risk Management

With a global event the scope and scale of the G20 Summit, the TPS anticipated there would be issues before, during and after that would require examination and analysis.

Prior to the G20 Summit, the TPS formed an internal After Action Review Team to report back on the lessons learned throughout the G20 Summit. The TPS also met with members of the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) and the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) to establish streamlined processes for dealing with public complaints and SIU-related incidents.

In the months following the G20 Summit, a number of external agencies commenced reviews into various aspects of the G20 Summit. In addition, in November 2010, the Chief travelled to Ottawa to answer questions from members of the House of Commons on various G20 Summit-related issues. The TPS is committed to assisting with these reviews, examining their findings and using the lessons learned to assist in planning and preparing for future events. In addition, the TPS is fully cooperating with the OIPRD and the SIU with respect to their investigations of complaints against police officers.

9.1 TPS Pre-G20 Summit Activities

After Action Review Team

In recognition of the need to provide an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the TPS G20 Summit plan and its execution, an internal After Action Review Team was formed in April 2010. The After Action Review Team's mandate was to examine, critique, and report on the TPS G20 Summit response in order to assist with future event planning.

Toronto Police Service's Professional Standards Unit

The TPS Professional Standards Unit (PRS) investigates internal complaints against TPS members and external complaints against members that have been forwarded to the TPS by the OIPRD. Members of PRS were part of the Planning Team and provided advice and information regarding the public complaint process in advance of the G20 Summit.

Special Investigations Unit

In advance of the G20 Summit, PRS recognized the need to establish a coordinated and systematic response to any SIU-related incident. PRS had several meetings with the SIU prior to the G20 Summit and formed an agreement which would provide guidance to all the involved police services.

The G20 Summit created a unique set of challenges for the TPS and the SIU. In addition to the RCMP, police services from across the country were working in various capacities in Toronto but were not governed by Ontario legislation.

On May 28, 2010, members of PRS met with representatives of all of the Ontario police services involved in the G20 Summit. Matters such as the reporting of injuries/deaths, memo books, access to scenes and legal representation were discussed and agreements were established.

All of the out of province police services were notified and provided with guidance with respect to their role and our responsibilities should an SIU-related incident occur.

Office of the Independent Police Review Director

On May 13, 2010, PRS met with the Director of the OIPRD and members of his team to discuss the process for dealing with public complaints against police arising during the G20 Summit.

PRS also extended an invitation to members of the OIPRD to tour the PPC prior to the G20 Summit. On June 22, 2010, the Director and the Manager of Investigations of the OIPRD met with members of PRS for an extensive tour of the facility. This provided OIPRD members with an understanding of the facility, including its layout and physical conditions.

9.2 TPS Post-G20 Summit Activities

Toronto Police Service's Professional Standards Unit

With respect to the G20 Summit, PRS is investigating and/or assisting in the investigation of all OIPRD complaints, SIU investigations, *Ontario Human Rights Code* complaints and civil actions.

As of May 1, 2011, there have been 286 complaints made to the OIPRD regarding the conduct, policies and services of police during the G20 Summit. Of these complaints, 196 were retained by the OIPRD and 90 were assigned to PRS for investigation. PRS is continuing to work with the OIPRD regarding its requests for documentation and assistance.

In addition to complaints made to the OIPRD and the SIU, 18 G20 Summit complaints have been made against the TPS and TPSB through civil actions or human rights complaints seeking financial compensation for protesters who were arrested, detained, injured, or whose property was damaged.

Due to the increased number of complaints, on January 10, 2011, the TPS formed a G20 PRS Investigative Team to conduct a proactive, investigative review of G20 Summit materials, specifically video and photographic information. The G20 PRS Investigative Team reviewed these materials to determine if officers made any attempt to disguise their identity, used unnecessary force or seriously breached any TPS rules/procedures. In addition, they looked for lack of supervision in any of the above listed situations.

As a result of the G20 PRS Investigative Team's review, 60 conduct investigations were initiated.

Based on the work of PRS and the G20 PRS Investigative Team, 108 officers have received disciplinary action (for removal of identification) under the *Police Services Act* and 1 officer was charged under the *Criminal Code* for Assault with a Weapon. PRS continues to manage and/or support a number of other ongoing G20 Summit-related conduct investigations.

The G20 PRS Investigative Team also assisted with identification issues and assessing officer conduct with respect to the civil claims and human rights complaints.

Special Investigations Unit

Ongoing cooperation with external services has been necessary and has continued well after the G20 Summit. Coordination of notes, documents and other evidence between the TPS, the SIU and our partner police agencies has been required given overlapping interests and involvement in matters where the SIU had invoked its mandate.

9.3 External Reviews

Toronto Police Services Board

The TPSB ordered that a public, independent review of the oversight, governance, and policy aspects of the integrated security operations of the G20 Summit should be conducted.

On September 30, 2010, the TPSB approved the retention of The Honourable John W. Morden to conduct the Independent Civilian Review of the policing of the G20 Summit. Although no specific date for the delivery of the review has been provided, on September 23, 2010, Justice Morden stated his wish to provide his report to the TPSB as expeditiously as possible. The TPS is cooperating fully in Mr. Morden's review and has dedicated police officers full time to assist Mr. Morden in obtaining the materials he feels he needs to conduct his review.

Office of the Independent Police Review Director

On July 22, 2010, the OIPRD announced that it would conduct a review of G20 Summit police complaints in addition to the intake and management of individual complaints received by the public. The OIPRD review will investigate common issues in relation to complaints against police during the G20 Summit. These include issues related to allegations of unlawful searches, unlawful arrests, improper detention and issues related to the temporary holding facility. The Terms of Reference for this review were released by the OIPRD on November 4, 2010.

Province of Ontario

On September 22, 2010, the Province of Ontario announced that it had launched a detailed, independent review of the *PWPA*. The review, led by former Ontario Chief Justice and Attorney General, The Honourable Roy McMurtry, was to take into account the historical context of the Act, including how it has been used in the past for the purpose of protecting public institutions. Mr. McMurtry released his report, "Report of the Review of the *Public Works Protection Act*" in late April 2010. The TPS cooperated fully in Mr. McMurtry's review.

Government of Canada

On Wednesday, November 3, 2010, the Chief was in Ottawa to answer questions from members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on matters relating to the operational policing decisions that were made in the City of Toronto over the course of the G20 Summit.

On Thursday, November 4, 2010, the Chief answered questions from members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates. The questions mainly related to the costs associated with providing security for the G20 Summit but also included issues related to planning, location and number of personnel required to staff the event.

10. Public Information

The role of the ISU Public Affairs Communications Team (PACT) was to inform all affected parties of the measures taken to ensure safe and secure G8/G20 Summits and maintain channels of communication before, during and after the event. During the G20 Summit, the PACT was supported by Public Information Officers (PIOs) who operated out of the MICC, Media Relations Officers (MROs) who were deployed to various G20 Summit sites and locations and the TPS Headquarters Call Centre (HQCC). The Community Relations Group (CRG) was formed during the planning stage to be a liaison between the teams planning the security for the G20 Summit and community members affected by these plans.

10.1 Community Relations Group

The mandate of the CRG was to reach out to the community to provide open, two-way dialogue about the G20 Summit's day-to-day impact. The CRG was staffed by members of the TPS, PRP and the RCMP. The original members of the CRG focussed on business and residential communities. Soon after, the team was expanded to include an Activist/Protester Outreach Team, tasked with approaching people and organizations who had publicly communicated their intent to engage in G20 Summit protests or demonstrations.

Business Community

The CRG developed contacts with the business community to ensure they were aware of what to expect during the G20 Summit and to answer questions and concerns. Contact was made through local Business Improvement Associations, city councillors and organizations such as the Toronto Association of Police and Private Security, a cooperative group comprised of police and private security agencies.

The CRG distributed information via pamphlets (hard copies and electronic versions), websites and social media, phone calls and emails, town-hall meetings, newsletters and mass mailings. By the end of June, they had logged more than 2500 contacts with the community. In addition, in partnership with the ISU Public Affairs Team, 14 community-specific messages and 25 news releases were issued before the G20 Summit.

Even though many G20 Summit details were security-sensitive, the CRG committed to sharing as much information as possible, and in a timely fashion. The CRG tried to provide accurate and reliable information that balanced the public's right to know with protecting the integrity of G20 Summit security measures. Members of the business community indicated that they found it difficult to plan strategically for the week when they were not supplied with the final location of the security fence. The CRG was cognizant of this issue and provided the general public with the location of the security fence as soon as it was so advised by the ISU.

Activist/Protester Outreach

Members of the CRG Activist/Protester Outreach Team worked with mainstream activist groups prior to and during the G20 Summit to facilitate peaceful and lawful protests. They also engaged in dialogue with individuals and groups whose publicly available information and history suggested a militant response to the G20 Summit. General ISU/G20 Summit information was distributed to both types of groups along with offers of further assistance. For the most part, there was little positive interaction between the CRG and the more militant activists. It is

important for the TPS to continue to engage with activists and protesters of all stripes to demonstrate our commitment to respecting the democratic rights of individuals.

10.2 Media Relations

The pre-G20 Summit Media Relations strategy was designed to work with the media to achieve the overall policing objectives of maintaining public confidence, facilitating lawful protest, and keeping the public informed. The TPS provided the media with opportunities to interact with the police and facilitated familiarization of reporters with policing techniques and equipment, particularly those related to public-order situations.

The HQCC was established to act as a central point for the dissemination of G20 Summit media releases and information. Timely press releases and media briefings were prepared to assure the public of the adequacy of police response for public order and community safety, anticipated protest activities, protest areas, and disruptions to traffic, transit and businesses. During operations, all media and public enquiries were to flow into the HQCC and be shared with the PIO in the MICC for message development and approval.

During the G20 Summit, the four mobile teams of MROs were deployed to the downtown core to filter information back to the HQCC and to respond to media inquiries. The MROs were at the heart of what was occurring on the streets, they gave many interviews to the media and provided useful information to the HQCC.

PIOs were embedded in the MICC and were responsible for coordinating with the HQCC and seeking approval from the Incident Commander regarding media messages. There were two PIOs assigned to the MICC at any one time – one from TPS Corporate Communications and one from the RCMP. Being located in the MICC allowed the PIOs to observe events as they were unfolding, from both the external media and internal operational perspectives, in order to develop appropriate media messages and responses.

10.3 Issues Management

Media relations is a double loop. Information is received as well as disseminated. The inbound loop is the *issues management* component, wherein problems and concerns are anticipated and addressed in a proactive and preventative fashion. The goal of issues management is to reduce risk or controversy to an organization's reputation. The inbound receipt of information, and its timely assessment and verification, can play an important role in the decision-making process of the MICC command.

During the G20 Summit weekend, members of the media were embedded in the protests and were reporting on events as they were occurring. The MROs were also at the scene of protest activities and provided the HQCC with valuable information. There was therefore a need for the timely flow of information between the HQCC and the MICC to ensure that information that would affect TPS operations was given to the Incident Commander immediately to allow the MICC to make appropriate decisions.

During the dynamic events of the G20 Summit weekend, the information flow between the MICC and the HQCC was restricted. As a result, there were instances where the information provided by the MICC contradicted information that the MROs at the scene had confirmed to be true. For future events, the flow of information from the MICC to the HQCC should adhere to established

protocol to ensure the accurate receipt, assessment, flow, response to, and retention of information.

Media reporting on G20 Summit activities was provided by a variety of sources including television, radio, newspapers – both on-line and print editions, internet blogs and message boards. Social media – including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube – was also used extensively by members of the public and the media to disseminate information about the G20 Summit. Both mainstream and social media were excellent sources of information and the perspective from which the media were reporting would have been useful for the Incident Commander, but the demands of monitoring these media sources were beyond the capacity of the limited staff at the HQCC and the 2 PIOs. With additional personnel, better monitoring of various media outlets and better coordination between the MICC and the HQCC might have been possible.

External members assigned to the HQCC and the PIO positions were re-deployed immediately after the G20 Summit ended. As a result, the TPS was left to address some of the controversial issues related to the G20 Summit that were, in fact, the collective responsibility of a number of partner agencies. In the future, the Public Information operational plan should include a planned demobilization phase of the integrated communications function. This will ensure that consistent media messaging will continue through the planning, operational, and close-out phases of the event.

Both during and following the G20 Summit there were instances where information was given to the public that was inaccurate and thus inadvertently misleading. There were also instances where information that, in retrospect, should have been given to the public was not. It is recognized that such errors undermine our credibility and challenge public trust.

11. Key Findings

11.1 Public Order Policing

As outlined in the Operation Chronology section of this report, the TPS and its partner agencies were faced with sustained, serious, and widespread criminality and public disorder on Saturday, June 26 and Sunday, June 27, 2010. The scope and intensity of the disorder are without precedent in the history of the TPS.

As radical elements broke away from the main protest crowd at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue on June 26, and began causing considerable damage to surrounding areas, POU sections lacked the mobility and speed to respond immediately to prevent further disorder. The POU needs to create deployment strategies to increase the mobility of POU sections and thereby enhance their ability to respond rapidly to fast-moving situations.

Current POU training predominantly focuses on the use of cordon formations, dispersals, arrest teams and other techniques devised to respond to largely static crowd formations. The POU needs to develop proactive strategies for use in dynamic situations such as when facing Black Bloc or similar tactics.

Crowd behaviour is influenced in part by the type and manner of police deployment. Premature displays of real or implied force can lead to negative crowd reactions that may escalate a situation. The initial contact by public order officers with protest groups, in the absence of clear indications to the contrary, should be low key and measured. The dynamic nature of the protest activities that occurred during the G20 Summit required officers not properly trained or equipped to do so to execute POU techniques. Future operations should consider enhanced use of non-POU officers in crowd management situations.

The MICC used containment techniques in response to perceived threats of disorder, violence, and criminality. However, persons not involved in such activities need to have both a route of egress from and a reasonable opportunity to leave the affected area. Such tactics need to include specific direction as to when they are to be used. When used, a controlled egress point should be established and appropriate notification provided to the crowd.

11.2 Planning

The Planning Team had a number of significant challenges including short timelines, the geographic location of the G20 Summit and the logistics of managing resources for thousands of officers. The short timelines and the need for the selected senior officers to carry out their regular duties prior to the G20 Summit did not allow for the Incident Commanders or field commanders to have input into or intimate knowledge of the planning process. The early inclusion of key personnel including a Sponsor (Deputy Chief), Incident Commander, Project Manager, Planning Chief, and field commanders may alleviate many of the issues faced by the Planning Team in the future.

To facilitate communication by radio, officers were assigned to talk groups that were created based on the IMS model and the geographical location of the officer's specific detail. In practice,

this was ineffective given that officers were moved from one area to another in response to changes in the tactical environment. During the incidents of violence that occurred during the G20 Summit weekend, individual officers, rather than just supervisors, began transmitting on the radio. The number of officers attempting to transmit meant the system was no longer optimally effective. Large event radio protocol should incorporate training for future events.

11.3 Training

The TPS was successful in training thousands of officers from both the TPS and external policing agencies at the Toronto Police College, and through on-line training, in a very short period of time. The use of both face-to-face and on-line training should be considered for future event planning.

IMS training was conducted so that members had an understanding of the model of command and control being used, understood their own role within the model, and had a clear understanding of how to apply the IMS model during operations. However, the amount of IMS training provided, number of practice sessions and realistic exercises leading up to a large-scale event need to be increased. Also, the time period between the event and the exercises should be sufficient to allow for a full debriefing and for any required changes to operational plans to be made.

11.4 Intelligence

The main challenge for the G8/G20 Summits' intelligence functions were systemic in nature as the respective mandates, responsibilities and processes of the primary partner agencies were restrictive. While the JIG process was effective in ensuring the security of the G8/G20 Summits, it was not as effective in providing timely intelligence for the public order issues that occurred away from the G20 Summit venues. In future, MOUs need to be established so that events of this nature will have an improved flow of intelligence information.

It is also important to ensure regular intelligence briefings occur with frontline and public order sections at the beginning of their shifts to promote officer safety and enhance overall operational effectiveness.

Given that effective intelligence-gathering is required well in advance of any major event, tactical intelligence functions must be resourced by properly trained and selected personnel early in the planning process. Secondments, with necessary resources, must occur in sufficient time to allow for event-specific training.

11.5 Prisoner Management

The differing visions of the Planning Team and Court Services for the functioning of the PPC led to a breakdown in communication during operations. This had a significant impact on how the facility functioned during the event. While the PPC was designed to operate much like a divisional police facility, differences in the standard procedures and processes used by court officers and by police officers were problematic and partially responsible for lengthy delays experienced by many who were detained at the PPC. For future events where both court officers and police officers are used in traditional policing functions, there needs to be adequate cross training provided.

Prisoner transport vehicles were staffed by court officers who do not have the same training as frontline officers. This prevented transport vehicles from attending arrest locations where violence was ongoing. For future events police officers should be assigned to prisoner transport vehicles when possible.

While it was intended that CIPS be used for tracking a prisoner through the PPC, additional tracking processes were employed by Court Services to track prisoners as they would be in a traditional court facility. The prisoner intake process employed by Court Services staff was not adequate to process, in a timely manner, the influx of prisoners that arrived at the PPC Saturday evening into Sunday morning. The information being collected was too much for one person to gather efficiently, and much of it was a duplication of what would have been contained in CIPS after a prisoner was paraded. Since CIPS was not used by court officers in the PPC, there was no central tracking system that provided real time information on the location of a prisoner, when he or she arrived, or whether he or she had been fed. For future events there should be one computer program/database for use by all members in a facility that addresses the needs of all stakeholders.

The ability to have duty counsel on-site during such an operation was convenient and allowed prisoners the ability to speak with counsel in person. The ability to have lawyers on-site on a 24-hour basis should be considered for similar operations to facilitate additional access for prisoners to duty counsel.

Due to the quantity of personal property brought to the PPC, and the lack of a consistent process to handle it, delays were experienced when prisoners were released or taken to court, as a substantial amount of time was spent searching for property. This could have been alleviated through the use of a control mechanism, such as a barcode, for prisoner management and property tracking.

After the mass release of prisoners that occurred on Sunday night, the staff sergeant assigned to the only release trailer could not manage the volume of prisoners being released. Many prisoners ended up being released from the holding area instead of individually before a staff sergeant, which is the appropriate process. While the mass release of prisoners was not anticipated prior to the G20 Summit, future significant events need to have a relatively equal number of parading and release trailers to ensure better prisoner management.

12. Recommendations

Recommendation 1: That the TPS prepare and train a cadre of major event specialists who can be mobilized and dedicated to supporting major events in the future with a more robust operational planning capacity. The early inclusion of key personnel including a Sponsor (Deputy Chief), Incident Commander, Project Manager, Planning Chief, and field commanders should be considered in future event planning.

Rationale: The short planning period did not allow sufficient time for a proper transition from planning to operational phases. There were an insufficient number of experienced planners, logistics experts and financial administrators available within the TPS and there was also an inability to fully dedicate enough of the TPS' few subject matter experts to the planning stage. Key operational personnel – including the officers assigned as incident and field commanders – were also unable to have input into or intimate knowledge of the planning process.

Recommendation 2: That the TPS conduct a training assessment and then implement a plan to ensure appropriate IMS training is provided to members (including practical exercises, formal operational debriefs and after action/lessons learned processes)

Rationale: Given the short planning period, there was not enough time to provide appropriate levels of IMS training to all members. There was also an insufficient number of practice sessions conducted so that the Incident Commander and field commanders could practically apply the IMS training in realistic exercises. This caused some confusion in terms of roles and responsibilities and impacted the ability to properly develop, test and approve rules of engagement.

Recommendation 3: That the TPS develop a practical application of IMS and related public order practices in order to provide MICC personnel and field commanders with a clearer understanding of their roles, responsibilities and respective decision-making authorities.

Rationale: The complexity and dynamics of the public order issues caused command, control and communication issues between MICC personnel and the field commanders at critical junctures during the G20 Summit. As noted in the previous recommendation, further training for all command and control positions is recommended so that roles and responsibilities at each level are more clearly understood and practiced with greater frequency, thereby helping to realize the potential of the IMS model.

Recommendation 4: That the TPS conduct a review in relation to public order management to better manage Black Bloc (or similar) tactics, mass disorder and major events like the G8/G20 Summits.

Rationale: There were times when crowd dynamics, coupled with the scope and scale of the mass disorder, overwhelmed police capacity. In particular, there was an inability to effectively prevent, mitigate and respond to the Black Bloc tactics employed within the broader theatre when mass disorder was taking place. This partially compromised the ability of police to respond in a measured way to dynamic situations and also resulted in the over committing of finite resources.

Recommendation 5: That the TPS develop and implement policies and procedures to identify, isolate, and extract individuals in a crowd who are believed to pose a threat to public safety.

Rationale: The MICC used containment techniques during the G20 Summit to respond to perceived threats of disorder, violence, and criminality. However, persons not directly involved in such activities were, at times, nonetheless subjected to these techniques. Better methods must be developed for extracting individuals posing a threat to public safety from within large crowds. It is clear that current tactics and processes cannot be executed without considerable time, resources and unwanted impact on affected individuals.

Recommendation 6: That Memoranda of Understanding for the intelligence function in events similar to the G8/G20 Summits be established to facilitate the effective flow of intelligence information. It is also recommended that regular intelligence briefings occur with frontline and public order sections at the beginning of their shifts to promote officer safety and enhance overall operational effectiveness. Secondments, with necessary resources, must occur in sufficient time to allow for event-specific training.

Rationale: The process employed by the Joint Intelligence Group was successful in ensuring the security of the G8/G20 Summits. However, the process fell short in providing timely intelligence for the public order issues that occurred away from the G20 Summit venues as the respective mandates, responsibilities and processes of the primary partner agencies were restrictive. Also, while prior to the G20 Summit intelligence briefings on identified security threats were provided more widely, during the actual period of the Summit the briefings were provided only to those at commander level. Finally, given that effective intelligence-gathering is required well in advance of any major event, tactical intelligence functions must be resourced by properly trained and selected personnel early in the planning process.

Recommendation 7: That the TPS research and develop facility and operational plans for large temporary detention centres for similar events. The plans should include improved facility location and design, high capacity intake and release systems, cross-training of court officers and police officers, a major event prisoner transport strategy, the use of a single prisoner management computer program, the continued use of on-site medical practitioners and duty counsel and enhanced prisoner property management systems.

Rationale: A number of prisoner management issues manifested themselves at the PPC throughout the G20 Summit. Lengthy delays were experienced in both booking and releasing prisoners. A number of capacity and facility issues also arose. In addition, there were problems with transporting prisoners to the PPC which led to additional delays and potential officer safety issues.

Recommendation 8: That the TPS enhance large event radio protocol, related procedures and training to improve communication discipline and effectiveness in future events.

Rationale: During the dynamic and disorderly crowd events that occurred during the G20 Summit weekend, communication issues were experienced when large numbers of officers attempted to transmit on the radio at the same time. The number of officers assigned to each radio channel and the rapid redeployment of resources contributed to these issues.

Recommendation 9: That the TPS develop issues management capacities to improve our abilities in the areas of public order operations, community mobilization, corporate communications, and media monitoring.

Rationale: Both traditional and social media presented new issues management opportunities and challenges for the police. Although the TPS significantly improved its ability to use corporate communications and community mobilization processes during the G20 Summit to communicate and collaborate with a diverse range of civic partners (some of whom worked very closely with the MICC), there were significant overall problems with issues management at critical times during and after the G20 Summit.

Recommendation 10: That the risk management initiatives undertaken by the TPS both prior to and after the G20 Summit be used in future event planning. This includes establishing protocol with partner police agencies regarding SIU investigations, liaising with the OIPRD, and dedicating resources to facilitate increases in requests for information and/or investigations.

Rationale: In the G20 Summit planning stage, the TPS took proactive risk management steps including creating the After Action Review Team and assigning the TPS Professional Standards Unit to liaise with the OIPRD and the SIU. The number of post-G20 Summit reviews, complaints, conduct investigations, and freedom of information requests necessitated an increased commitment of resources. To address this issue, the TPS created the G20 Disclosure Team and the PRS G20 Investigative Team.

Conclusion

The findings of the After Action Review illustrate that there were areas in which the TPS was able to meet the demands of planning and executing the largest security event in Canadian history. While host cities of some previous G8/G20 summits had two years to prepare, the TPS was able to meet the security demands required to facilitate a global economic summit in just six months. As a result, the TPS was successful in fulfilling its mission to support the RCMP and their mandate of ensuring the safety and security of the G8/G20 Summits delegations. At no time was security breached at any of the G20 Summit sites.

The TPS also conducted multiple training sessions to ensure the safety and security of the public and law enforcement officials. Safety was of utmost importance for both the Incident Commander in the MICC and field commanders on the ground during the dynamic and violent situations officers faced on Saturday and Sunday of the G20 Summit. There were no critical injuries or deaths during the G20 Summit in Toronto. The TPS was also able to provide a regular standard of police service to the rest of the city of Toronto despite having more than half its uniform strength assigned to G20 Summit duties.

Members of the CRG worked with partner agencies, activist groups and individuals to facilitate peaceful and lawful protests both prior to and during the G20 Summit. The CRG also engaged in dialogue with groups and individuals who had expressed their intent to disrupt the G20 Summit. It is important for the TPS to continue to engage with these and similarly-minded groups to show our commitment to respecting the democratic rights of individuals.

The violence experienced on June 26 and June 27 and subsequent police action – including the containment of individuals at Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue on June 27 – illustrate the need improve POU training so that the TPS can more effectively respond to criminal activity and public disorder while at the same time allowing individuals to protest peacefully.

Risk management was considered throughout every stage of the G20 Summit in anticipation of issues around public complaints, civil suits and demands for public inquiries. PRS has worked with partner police agencies, the OIPRD and the SIU prior to, during and after the G20 Summit to guarantee proper procedures are followed in the investigation of public complaints and SIU-mandated investigations. The TPS will continue to assist these agencies with ongoing and future investigations. Internal investigations conducted by the TPS addressed conduct issues arising from the G20 Summit. These investigations have resulted in many officers being subject to disciplinary action.

The TPS has cooperated, and will continue to cooperate, with the TPSB, the OIPRD and the Government of Ontario in their reviews of the G20 Summit. The TPS is committed to assisting with these reviews, examining their findings and using the lessons learned to enhance the planning and preparing of future events.

Appendices

A. Glossary of Acronyms


ACRONYM	DEFINITION
ACC	GTA Area Command Centre
CAZ	Controlled Access Zone
CF	Canadian Forces
Chief	Toronto Police Chief
CIPS	Criminal Information Processing System
CRG	Community Relations Group
CRU	Community Response Unit
EDU	Explosives Disposal Unit
EMS	Toronto Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre
ETF	Emergency Task Force
F&A	Finance & Administration
FMIOA	Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act
HOT	Prisoner Hand Off Teams
HQCC	Toronto Police Service Headquarters Call Centre
IMS	Incident Management System
IPP	Internationally Protected Person
ISU	Integrated Security Unit
IZ	Interdiction Zone
JIG	Joint Intelligence Group
LogOps	Logistics Operations Centre
LRAD	Long Range Acoustic Device
MICC	Major Incident Command Centre
MOA	Memoranda of Agreement
MOU	Memoranda of Understanding
MRO	Media Relations Officer
MTCC	Metro Toronto Convention Centre
OIC	Officer in Charge
OIPRD	Office of the Independent Police Review Director
OPP	Ontario Provincial Police
OZ	Outer Zone
PEMU	Property & Evidence Management Unit
PIO	Public Information Officer
Planning Team	G8/G20 Planning Team

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
POU	Public Order Unit
PPC	Prisoner Processing Centre
PRP	Peel Regional Police
PRS	Professional Standards Unit
PRU	Primary Response Unit
PS&EM	Public Safety & Emergency Management
PWPA	Public Works Protection Act
RAZ	Restricted Access Zone
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SIU	Special Investigation Unit
SMO	Summit Management Office
TFS	Toronto Fire Services
TPS	Toronto Police Service
TPSB	Toronto Police Services Board
TSV	Traffic Services
TTC	Toronto Transit Commission
UCC	Unified Command Centre

B. Global Summit Comparison

Year	Event	Location	No. of Arrests	Commentary
1999	World Trade Organization	Seattle	601	Delegates attacked (minor injuries), meetings suspended, heavy property damage from riots occurring over several days
2000	World Bank Summit	Washington	678	Extensive property damage and large groups of protesters
2001	Summit of the Americas	Quebec City	463	Riots, property damage, injuries. Perimeter fence was defeated by protesters
2001	G8	Genoa, Italy	329	200,000 protesters, 400 protesters injured with one fatality, 100 security officers injured. Extensive rioting and property damage
2002	G7	Washington D.C.	649	Anti International Monetary Fund protests resulted in the arrests of over 600 people in one day
2003	E.U. Summit	Athens, Greece	106	Riots and property damage
2004	Republican National Convention	New York	1821	Massive rallies, most arrests for minor offences over a period of several days
2005	G8	Gleneagles Scotland	358	Isolated venue outside of Edinburgh – bulk of protest activity occurred in major city.
2006	G8	Russia	200	Limited info is available, still a somewhat closed government. Arrests were made prior to event.
2007	G8	Germany	1,057	Property damage, summit was delayed several days by protesters who blocked access to the venue
2008	G8	Japan	44	Event was held in a remote area surrounded by 21,000 police officers - 40 arrests prior to the event, 4 during
2009	G20	London	122	One protester death, large amount of property damage predominantly to financial institutions
2009	G20	Pittsburgh	190	Geographical location of the summit allowed police to contain the venue quite well. Protest groups were of a smaller size than other events.
2009	UN Conference on Climate Change	Copenhagen	>1,000	On the second day of the conference 968 protesters were arrested. The average was approximately 240 arrests on other days
2010	G20	Toronto	1,118	Riots and property damage

C. G20 Summit Command Centres



Dotted black line indicates a reporting relationship, though Command Centres had full operational control for their specific areas of responsibility.

Downtown Toronto - G20 Sites and Security Zones

Legend:

- Security Perimeter
- Pedestrian Walkway

Overlying Map:

- Prisoner Processing Center
- G20 Eastern Ave

E. Map of G20 Events – June 26, 2010

